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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent, illustrated version of the United States Constitution,
issued in commemoration of its bicentennial, portrays the fourth
amendment with a drawing of a home sitting atop the turret of a
* Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark School of Law, Brigham Young Univer-
sity. The author expresses his thanks to J. Robert Crook, who assisted in the research of
this Article.
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castle.1 The artistic statement aptly captures the common under-
standing of fourth amendment protections: A man's home is his
castle, at least when it comes to governmental intrusions. Two re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, however, that uphold the aerial sur-
veillance of a suburban backyard and a commercial manufacturing
facility, appear to challenge this popular perception.2 The home
may be a castle-but that castle is impregnable only when nothing
photogenic is occurring in the courtyard.
The aerial surveillance decisions raise anew a continually per-
plexing fourth amendment issue: When has a "search" occurred?
The issue is important because "searches are presumptively im-
proper unless authorized in advance by a warrant."'3 The question,
moreover, has been a heated one since the inception of the Repub-
lic.4 Supreme Court briefs filed in the recent aerial surveillance
1. S. FINK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, article IV (1985) (pages in book
not numbered).
2. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S.
Ct. 1819 (1986). Ciraolo and Dow were decided on the same day.
3. Most cases construing the provisions of the first clause of the fourth amendment
("[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated") present two questions. First, has
a "search" within the meaning of the amendment taken place? Second, if so, was the search
"unreasonable?" The resolution of the first question, as this Article demonstrates, has gen-
erated substantial doubt and litigation.- The answer to the second has tended to turn on the
outcome of the first, because for the past 40 years the Court rigidly has held that a "search"
is "unreasonable" unless conducted in conformity with the second clause of the amendment,
known as the "warrant clause" ("and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized"). See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948)
("When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer;" only in "exceptional circumstances ... may [it] be contended
that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with"). Thus, if a "search" has
occurred the Court has held the search to be "unreasonable" unless authorized in advance
by a valid warrant or undertaken in "exigent" circumstances. See, e.g., New York v. Class,
475 U.S. 106 (1986).
This Article will not deal explicitly with whether a given search is "unreasonable" or
whether the Court's rather monolithic approach to that issue should be modified. See, e.g.,
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (by emphasiz-
ing the warrant requirement over the general "reasonableness" of a search, the Court has
"'stood the fourth amendment on its head' from a historical standpoint"), quoting Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Article addresses
only the basic question of when a "search," triggering the substantive provisions of the
fourth amendment, has occurred.
4. Disputes regarding the coverage of the fourth amendment began with disagree-
ments over the final wording of the amendment. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101 (1937). Furthermore,
the fourth amendment's adoption did not end the controversy. See, e.g., Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) ("Few areas of the law have been as
subject to shifting constitutional standards over the last 50 years as that of the search 'inci-
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cases, for example, raised the spectre of George Orwell's airborne
Police Patrols5 to counter assertions that warrantless aerial surveil-
lance is a necessary and legitimate tool in the eradication of socie-
tal crime.' The earnest debate of these questions, almost 200 years
after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, demonstrates the amor-
phous nature of fourth amendment jurisprudence; doctrine evolves
continually to meet the needs of changing circumstances.
During the past fifty years, the rapid development of elec-
tronic and other technologically-enhanced means of surveillance
has been the primary source of fourth amendment evolutionary
pressure. Faced with police use of investigative techniques beyond
the ken of the drafters of the fourth amendment, the Supreme
Court handed down the landmark 1967 decision in Katz v. United
States.7 In Katz the court adopted a flexible "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" analysis for resolving search and seizure issues.
But, for all its virtues, this modern "privacy" approach often em-
bodies more "flex" than "analysis." Indeed, the judiciary has
floundered in its attempt to delineate which expectations of pri-
dent to an arrest.' There has been remarkable instability in this whole area . . ."). The
continuing debate surrounding the fourth amendment can be attributed to the fundamental
values it seeks to protect. As the Supreme Court noted in Union Pacific Railroad v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and con-
trol of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." Understandably, the controversy has not been confined to
the ivory towers of legal scholarship, but instead has perplexed lawyers, judges, police, and
ordinary citizens. In the preface to his celebrated treatise on the fourth amendment, Profes-
sor Wayne LaFave notes that the intensive debate continues undiminished: "[I]t is beyond
question that the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of more litigation than any other
provision in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, I would be willing to wager.., that.., lawyers and
judges have spilled more words over the Fourth Amendment than all of the rest of the Bill
of Rights taken together." 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, at v (2d ed. 1986).
5. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 8 n.6, California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (No. 84-1513),
quoting G. ORWELL, 1984, at 6 (1949); Brief for the Civil Liberties Monitoring Project as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7, California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986)
(No. 84-1513), quoting G. ORWELL, 1984, at 6 (1949).
6. Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, joined
by The International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., The Airborne Law Enforcement
Association, Inc., and the Legal Foundation of America In Support of Petitioner at 7-8,
California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (No. 84-1513); Brief for the Washington Legal
Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-8, California v. Ciraolo, 106 S.
Ct. 1809 (1986) (No. 84-1513); Brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 27-32, California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (No.
84-1513).
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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vacy are "reasonable." The potentially limitless range of factors
relevant to that determination has resulted in divergent and con-
flicting analytical resolutions.8
The resulting disorder in fourth amendment jurisprudence has
been a boon to legal commentators, who have been quick to criti-
cize and point out inconsistencies in discrete cases.' Although the
literature has highlighted the confusion, it hardly has calmed the
disarray. This deplorable condition need not continue. After two
decades of uncertainty, a workable set of criteria is discernable in
the stated rationales of Supreme Court decisions to guide the
course of future fourth amendment litigation-a course that, to say
the least, has not been well marked.
A careful analysis of Supreme Court cases both prior and sub-
sequent to Katz, with an emphasis on the perspective afforded by
the Court's most recent decisions, reveals that the Court focuses on
three interrelated inquiries in determining whether governmental
surveillance violates a "reasonable expectation of privacy:" (1) the
place of location where the surveillance occurs; (2) the nature and
degree of intrusiveness of the surveillance itself; and (3) the object
or goal of the surveillance. While the Court has not adopted explic-
itly this trio of factors as a formal legal test, the stated grounds of
decision in cases both before and after Katz imply this approach.
The time has come to give some definite analytical content to the
amorphous Katz "reasonableness" test. The three inquiries identi-
fied in this Article, if explicitly isolated and analyzed in the con-
text of actual cases, will both illuminate and rationalize the judicial
function in enforcing fourth amendment protections.
This Article traces the historical background and modern sup-
port for a tripartite "search" analysis. The second section exam-
ines the historic definition of a "search" within the meaning of the
8. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text; see also Wald, The Unreasonable
Reasonableness Test for Fourth Amendment Searches, 4 CRlM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring
1985, at 2; Note, United States v. Jacobsen: Expanded Private Search Doctrine Undermin-
ing Fourth Amendment Values, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359 (1985); Note, Oliver v. United
States: Will Expectations of Privacy Shield Criminal Acts No More?, 36 MERCER L. REv.
1401 (1985); Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for
the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 725 (1985); Note, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search:
A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986);
Note, "Bright Lines" Enter the Gray Zone: Application of Automobile Search Incident to
Arrest Standards to Non-Automobile Cases, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 587 (1985); Note, New
Jersey v. T.L.O.: Finding a Reasonable Standard For Searches in Public Schools, 12 W. ST.
U.L. REv. 873 (1985); Note, What is a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 12 W. ST. U.L.
REv. 849 (1985).
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fourth amendment. That determination, which originally depended
almost entirely upon notions derived from the law of trespass,
came under extreme pressure as modern technology began to de-
velop modes of surveillance that did not require a physical intru-
sion. These practical and logical tensions resulted in the Katz
decision.
The third section of this Article demonstrates that, despite its
virtues, Katz created unique difficulties of its own as the courts
tackled the nebulous task of applying a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test to concrete facts. The fourth section examines a par-
ticularly egregious example of the problems engendered by Katz:
Whether the opening of a container taken from a properly stopped
automobile constitutes a "search." The Court quelled the pande-
monium created by this line of cases only by expanding the scope
of the "automobile exception" to the warrant clause, thus making
unnecessary any determination whether the opening of a given
container violated a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
The fifth section of this Article analyzes the Court's most re-
cent "search" decisions and demonstrates that the Court has nar-
rowed dramatically the range of factors it considers under the Katz
privacy analysis. Rather than examining all possible evidence im-
pinging upon the reasonableness of a claimed privacy expectation,
the Court focuses on the place where governmental surveillance oc-
curs, the intrusiveness of the procedures used, and the object of
the surveillance itself.
Finally, the sixth section of this Article describes both pre-
and post-Katz cases, showing the consistent, albeit oftentimes im-
plicit, utilization of the above three concerns as grounds of deci-
sion. Fourth amendment "search" jurisprudence would become
substantially less hazy-and the decision of concrete cases signifi-
cantly simplified-if the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
were to adopt explicitly this multi-factor analysis.
II. AN HISTORICAL OvERvEw: FROM PLACES TO PRIVACY
Governmental authority to search private property had a long
and turbulent history prior to the creation of the search warrant,
the modern policeman, or the fourth amendment. 10 The first offi-
10. For a comprehensive history of the development of fourth amendment jurispru-
dence, including English common-law antecedents, see N. LASSON, supra note 4; see also
Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961) (tracing English com-
mon-law precursors to the fourth amendment).
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cial use of such governmental power developed in England shortly
after the invention of the printing press, largely because Parlia-
ment feared seditious or libelous publications." By the sixteenth
century, the Crown commonly used general warrants (authorizing
virtually indiscriminate searches to enforce publication statutes)
and writs of assistance (authorizing searches and seizures to en-
force import duty laws).' 2
In the mid-seventeenth century, however, public opposition to
the unrestrained search and seizure power authorized by general
warrants and writs of assistance escalated rapidly,13 and the war-
rants and writs became the targets of increasing criticism.1 4 Wil-
liam Pitt's celebrated and impassioned plea for the common man's
right to freedom from indiscriminate government searches captures
the emotional fervor that even today characterizes search and
seizure issues:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through
it-the storm may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England can-
not enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement! 5
Pitt's rhetoric, however, had little initial effect; the government
continued to issue general warrants. 16
Growing resentment among the English populace, coupled
with judicial concern regarding indiscriminate searches, resulted in
the landmark decision of Entick v. Carrington.17 In Entick the sec-
retary of state had issued a general warrant authorizing the search
of John Entick's home and the seizure of his papers on the grounds
that they contained seditious libel. Entick brought a trespass ac-
tion for damages challenging the resulting four-hour search of his
11. N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 24-25.
12. Id. at 28-32.
13. By the year 1643, "public opinion ... was becoming more and more sensitive to
arbitrary practice and more alive to what ought to be the right of the individual. This grow-
ing consciousness was in line with what the judges were doing in developing the common
law." Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
14. See Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763) (denouncing the general
warrant as "worse than the Spanish inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would
wish to live one hour"); see also Marcus, 367 U.S. at 729 n.22 (quoting a London pamphlet
criticizing the general warrant as "infamous in theory, and downright tyranny and despot-
ism in practice").
15. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
William Pitt).
16. N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 37.
17. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1030 (1765).
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property.' 8 Lord Camden's opinion, upholding a verdict for Entick,
held the general warrant invalid. Although Lord Camden suggested
that some limited governmental incursions may be justified when
private rights are "abridged by some public law for the good of the
whole," '19 he concluded that the general warrant exceeded a proper
balance of individual rights and public necessity. Because there
was no established law authorizing the wholesale search and
seizure of goods and chattels, Lord Camden concluded that the
general warrant was an intrusion proscribed by the English com-
mon law of trespass.2 0
Thus, Entick delineated the fundamental analysis that, even
today, influences the outcome of a challenge to governmental au-
thority to conduct a search: the essential inquiry balances public
necessity with individual rights. In assessing that balance against
the common-law milieu of eighteenth-century England, the Entick
court relied upon rights embodied in the law of trespass as a ready
benchmark with which to gauge the propriety of governmental sur-
veillance. Nineteenth-century American courts soon followed suit.
The Supreme Court adopted Entick's approach to the limits
on governmental search and seizure authority in its interpretation
of the fourth amendment.2 1 The Court condemned searches con-
ducted pursuant to governmental authorizations analogous to gen-
eral warrants or writs of assistance as "unreasonable searches and
seizures" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 22 But,
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1066.
20. The defendants had argued that the general warrant was valid because "at differ-
ent times from the time of the Revolution to this present time, the like warrants with that
issued against the plaintiff, have been frequently granted by the secretaries of state." Id. at
1035. Lord Camden held, however, that despite the general warrant's long usage, no statute
or common-law authority validated its issuance. Id. at 1066 ("Where is the written law that
gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none; and therefore it is too
much for us without such authority to pronounce a practice legal, which would be subversive
of all the comforts of society"). Lord Camden rejected the defendants' analogy to a writ
authorizing a search for stolen property because he found no procedural safeguards sur-
rounding the issuance or execution of the general warrant, id. at 1063, in contrast to "the
caution with which the law proceeds" in the case of stolen goods, id. at 1067. Accordingly,
Lord Camden concluded that the search of Entick's dwelling house "is a trespass." d. at
1066. "By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute is a
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an
action, though the damages be nothing. . . . Papers are the owner's goods and chattels:
They are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly
bear an inspection." Id.
21. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
22. Id. at 626-27 ("it may confidently be asserted that [Entick's] propositions were in
the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were con-
1987] 1083
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
more importantly for the purposes of this Article, Entick's trespass
analysis became essential in determining when there had been a
"search" in the first place.
For example, in Boyd v. United States,23 the Court reasoned
that the seizure of "private books and papers" of an "owner of
goods" might be an unlawful "search" because of the owner's inter-
est in retaining custody of the goods.24 The Court began to link the
"search" issue to property law constructs such as trespass. In fact,
the Court suggested that, if the object of the governmental intru-
sion in Boyd had been stolen goods, the Court would have found
no constitutional objection because the defendant lacked any pro-
prietary interest in the property seized.25 Following Boyd, the
Court's "search" definition became highly dependent upon techni-
cal concepts associated with the law of trespass, including the re-
quirement of an actual physical intrusion.26
The Court's strict catenation of the concept of a "search" to
the law of trespass was modified by Justice Holmes' decision in
Hester v. United States.2 7 In Hester the Court created an excep-
tion to the strict, trespassory notion of a "search" by holding that
a simple trespass upon agricultural land did not violate the fourth
amendment because the amendment's protection of "the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' [does] not extend[] to
the open fields."'28 Thus, a defendant's claim of a proprietary inter-
est in property no longer sufficed to invoke the protection of the
fourth amendment; a defendant also had to establish that the locus
of the governmental intrusion was a constitutionally protected
sidered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and
seizures").
23. Id.
24. Id. at 634-35.
25. Id. at 624; see also Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illi-
nois: From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 197, 201 (1981).
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (actual physical intrusion required
as predicate for a "search"); see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (same proposi-
tion); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (same proposition).
The impact of the Court's association of the constitutional concept of a "search" with
the smaller details of property and tort law should not be overstated, however. In the course
of developing a jurisprudential scheme which related the concepts of "search" and "tres-
pass," the Court never completely lost sight of the underlying purpose of the fourth amend-
ment-the protection of personal liberty. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The point is simply that,
even though the "privacies of life" animated the amendment, the Court seemed to assume
that an invasion of such "privacies" went hand in hand with (and perhaps required) an
"invasion of... private property." Id.
27. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
28. Id. at 59.
[Vol. 40:10771084
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"place." In the years following Hester, the Court revisited repeat-
edly the question whether particular locales were more analogous
to "open fields" or to "houses, papers, and effects."29
The Court's property-based ° construction of the fourth
amendment proved to be remarkably durable-even in the face of
technological advances that made judicial inquiries into "place"
and "physical intrusion" seem quaint, if not wholly unsatisfactory.
Despite the strain evidenced in dissents to the earliest decisions
concerning modern electronic surveillance,3 1 the Court's two-step
analysis of the amendment survived remarkably intact until 1967.
Regardless of fact pattern, cases raising a fourth amendment
search issue proceeded along predictable channels: Did the govern-
mental intrusion occur within a constitutionally protected place? If
so, was the intrusion accompanied by a constitutionally objectiona-
ble physical invasion?3 2
By 1967, however, electronic surveillance was common-
place-and was itself on the brink of a new era soon to be heralded
by the introduction of the micro-chip. Intrusion upon the most
29. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel rooms within amend-
ment); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (rented apartments within amend-
ment); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (taxi cabs within amendment); Gambino v.
United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (parked cars within amendment); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1921) (stores within amendment); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921) (offices within the protection of the fourth amendment).
30. See, e.g., Mickenberg, supra note 25, at 199.
31. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. at 474, 478:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the Gov-
ernment, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home ....
* * [The makers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Later dissenting opinions repeated and amplified Justice Brandeis' early objections. See,
e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 468 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (following a
severe and detailed criticism of Olmstead, Justice Brennan noted that modern surveillance
techniques "permit a degree of invasion of privacy that can only be described as frighten-
ing"); see also infra note 48.
32. See cases cited supra note 26.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1986) (Title HI of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 "was written in [a] different technological and
regulatory era" than the present; "[tioday, we have large-scale electronic mall operations,
cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices, miniaturized transmitters for radio surveil-
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intimate of conversations within the most private of enclaves re-
quired no physical penetration, and the inquiries mandated by ex-
isting law produced unsatisfactory-and often highly formalis-
tic-results.3 4 Moreover, the Court itself began to express-this
time in majority opinions-growing discomfort with the state of
fourth amendment jurisprudence."'
In Katz v. United States"5 the Supreme Court cleared the
decks. Henceforth, the Court declared, the infringement of a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy-not the physical intrusion upon a
protected place-would govern the applicability of the fourth
amendment.
III. FROM PRIVACY TO PANDEMONIUM: APPLICATION OF KATZ IN A
VACUUM
In Katz the Court concluded that the occupant of a public
telephone booth had been subjected to a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment when FBI agents at-
tached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside
of the booth. The Court rejected the government's assertions that
no "search" had occurred because the phone booth was not a "con-
stitutionally protected area"37 and because the agents had accom-
plished the surveillance without a technical trespass or "physical
intrusion" into the booth itself.38 Declaring that the fourth amend-
ment protects "people, not places, 3 9 the Court held that, notwith-
standing the place where the search occurred or the nonintrusive
nature of the search itself,40 the fourth amendment's warrant
clause applied to the FBI's investigatory activities. 1 Justice
Harlan, in his now famous concurrence, capsulized what has be-
lance, and a dazzling array of digitized information networks which were little more than
concepts two decades ago").
34. In Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), for example, the Court found the predi-
cate physical intrusion required for a "search" because a microphone had been attached to a
wall with a thumbtack.
35. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) ("[I]t is unnecessary and
ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law
in evolving the body of private property law . . ."), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961),
overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. Id. at 350.
38. Id. at 353.
39. Id. at 351.
40. Id. at 350, 353.
41. Id. at 359.
1086 [Vol. 40:1077
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come the accepted rationale of Katz: 42 the fourth amendment ap-
plies-that is, a "search" has occurred triggering the protections of
that provision-any time police investigatory activities infringe an
"expectation of privacy" that "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' ,,43
Katz revolutionized fourth amendment search analysis. 4
Armed with the new "reasonable expectations of privacy" test,
courts were equipped to subject a wide range of emerging police
investigatory techniques to constitutional scrutiny.4 5 And prior
law, which had focused primarily on physical intrusions into pro-
tected enclaves,4" was largely ignored in that process. 47
The Court's abandonment of a rigid, property-based construc-
42. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)
(superseded by statute as stated in Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 209 (D.D.C. 1980));
Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962
(1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
43. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 hNN. L. REv. 349, 382
(1974) (Katz marked a "watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence"); Note, From Pri-
vate Places to Personal Privacy a Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43
N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 975 (1968); see also Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. Rav. 133; Comment, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping, and
the Law of Search and Seizure-Some Implications of the Katz Decision, 9 ARiz. L. REv.
428 (1968); Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Electronic Eavesdropping-Katz v.
United States, 5 Hous. L. Rav. 990 (1968).
45. See generally United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (secret televi-
sion and subsequent use of video tapes), cert. denied sub nom. Rodriguez v. United States,
470 U.S. 1087 (1985); United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1984) (hidden tele-
phone ear piece); United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.) (aircraft transponder),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1983)
(electronic homing transmitter), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 468 U.S. 1212 (1984);
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (high powered telescope); United
States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980) (electronic beeper); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (telephone wiretap), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713
(1981); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976) (electronic location buzzer);
United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1976) (voice recorder); United States v.
Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (battery-operated beacon); United States v. Frazier,
538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976) (tracking device), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977); United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (airport luggage surveillance device).
46. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
47. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 250 (1969) ("Katz for the first time
explicitly overruled the 'physical penetration' and 'trespass' tests enunciated in earlier deci-
sions of this Court").
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tion of the fourth amendment relieved much of the pressure en-
gendered by technological advances unknown to Lord Camden at
the time he decided Entick, and laid to rest most of the criticism
that the law had become stilted and anachronistic in its attempts
to accommodate modern investigative technology with fourth
amendment concerns. 48 But, in the process of eschewing the tradi-
tional considerations of "protected enclaves" and "trespassory in-
trusion" in favor of "reasonable privacy expectations," Katz cre-
ated its own difficulties. The decision seemed to banish to legal
limbo much of the judiciary's prior experience with the fourth
amendment, 49 and the highly elastic boundaries of the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test made judicial construction of the
amendment quite haphazard. Under Katz the fourth amendment
applies whenever government activity infringes upon a "reasonable
expectation of privacy;" unfortunately, however, Katz itself pro-
vides no clear indication how the lower courts are to draw that
line. °
48. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,459 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The Constitution would be an utterly impractical instrument of contemporary government
if it were deemed to reach only problems familiar to the technology of the eighteenth cen-
tury"); see also Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Elec-
tronic Surveillance, 74 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983); King, Wire Tapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 DicK. L. REv. 17 (1961);
Semerjian, Proposals on Wiretapping in Light of Recent Senate Hearings, 45 B.U.L. REV.
216 (1965); Sullivan, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18
HASTINGs L.J. 59 (1966-67).
49. Numerous cases following Katz, for example, suggested that a consideration of
place or physical intrusion was no longer significant in the determination whether a
"search" had occurred. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 615 (1980) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("no talismanic significance is given to the fact that an arrest occurs in the home
rather than elsewhere"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
("In Katz. . . the Court rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects places or
property .. "); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) ("rather than property rights,
the primary object of the Fourth Amendment was determined to be the protection of pri-
vacy"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Officers, 403 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1971) ("Our
recent decisions. . . made it clear beyond peradventure that the Fourth Amendment is not
tied to the niceties of local trespass law"); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 246 (1969)
("[Katz] overruled cases holding that a search and seizure . . . requires some trespass or
actual penetration of a particular enclosure"); Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968)
("Katz ... makes it clear that capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment depends
not upon a property right in the invaded place . . ."). But cf. Patler v. United States, 503
F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974) ("The maxim of Katz that the fourth amendment protects
'people not places' is only of limited usefulness, for in considering what people can reason-
ably expect to maintain as private we must inevitably speak in terms of places").
50. The Ninth Circuit once complained that, while Katz held that the fourth "protects
people, not places," the decision "does not tell us what people are protected, when they are
protected, or why they are protected." United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973). Commentators also have criticized the amorphous nature
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The factual variables arguably relevant in determining
whether a given situation involves an "expectation of privacy" that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" are well-nigh limit-
less. Literature discussing the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
has suggested that the question should hinge on a broad spectrum
of inquiries ranging from an analysis of social norms, to a determi-
nation of government agents' subjective intent, to a flat per se pro-
scription of all artificial sense enhancement. 51 Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Oliver v. United States,2 suggested for his part that
the issue should be resolved by a consideration of "whether the
expectation. . is rooted in entitlements defined by positive law,"
the "uses to which [the place where the search occurred] can be
put," and "whether the person claiming a privacy interest mani-
fested that interest to the public in a way that most people would
understand and respect." 3
of the Katz test. Professor LaFave, for example, noted that:
[WIhile Katz 'has rapidly become the basis of a new formula of fourth amendment
coverage,' it can hardly be said that the Court produced clarity where theretofore there
had been uncertainty .... The pre-Katz rule, though perhaps 'unjust,' was 'a worka-
ble tool for the reasoning of the courts.' But the Katz rule.., is by comparison 'diffi-
cult to apply.'
W, LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 2.1(b), at 307 (footnotes omitted); accord, Doernberg, "The
Right of the People". Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth
Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 271 n.70 (1983); Note, The Interest in Limiting the
Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139, 154
n.67 (1983).
A national report issued 10 years ago pointed out that "[n]o one rightly laments the
demise of the old trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment" because modern technology
has rendered that line of analysis obsolete. Report of the National Commission for the Re-
view of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, at 204
(1976) [hereinafter NWC Report]. The report noted, however, that "the Court's new rule,
too, may well miss its mark [because] its line is drawn only at the point of judicially deter-
mined 'reasonableness.' Unfortunately, the Court has, as yet, given us no formula or ready
litmus-paper test to determine where that line is, in fact or law, to be drawn." Id.
51. See, e.g., Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MAR.
L. REV. 455, 475 (1984) (the question whether a "search" has occurred should turn upon
"whether the observations were inadvertent or systematic; whether the activity was directed
as [sic] specific people or property; or, whether the observations were general in nature");
Comment, Open Air Searches and Enhanced Surveillance in California, 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 779, 798 (1981) ("So long as that which is viewed or heard is in fact perceptible to the
naked eye or unaided ear of the government agent whose vantage point is neither unreason-
ably clandestine nor assisted by mechanical devices, the person seen or heard has no reason-
able expectation of privacy in what occurs"); Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment
Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191,
207 (1986) ("social norm of privacy should serve as a standard for defining fourth amend-
ment searches").
52. 466 U.S. 170, 189 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
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With no clear guidelines as to the scope of the inquiry, liti-
gants have urged that the height of particular fences5 ' and the spe-
cific provisions of substantive tort law-such as the protection ac-
corded "trade secrets" 5 -- control the analysis of whether their
respective "expectations of privacy" fall within the Katz standard.
Given the seemingly indeterminate Katz test, and the broad range
of factors logically impinging upon it, the lower courts' sometimes
inconsistent application of the standard is understandable. 6
But the difficulties associated with the "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" analysis have not been limited to the lower courts.
The Supreme Court's own renowned travail in articulating worka-
ble standards for determining when the opening of a given
54. See, e.g., Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Lib-
erties Union of Northern California as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (No. 84-1513) ("In the instant case, there is no
question that Mr. Ciraolo exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and that this expec-
tation was reasonable. He protected his backyard from outside observation by an exterior
fence six feet in height and by an interior fence rising about 10 feet, which connected the
perimeter fence to the house").
55. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 22-23, Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986) (No. 84-1259) ("Making reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of a trade secret is a condition precedent to alleging that information or technology
in fact constitutes a protectable trade secret.. . . Trade secrets require a context of privacy,
or at least the possibility of privacy for their existence. A threat to Dow's privacy threatens
its very existence and integrity as a scientific, technological and research-based company")
(citation omitted).
56. Compare United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) (criticiz-
ing cases which have "cast the problem in terms of the degree of intrusiveness" because
"[a]n intrusion is not de minimus if it violates an individual's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy") with United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1321 n.11 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[U]nless
there is an 'invasion' of the defendant's interest, the fact that the defendant had a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, is immaterial. In order to determine if it is 'reasonable' for soci-
ety to recognize the defendant's expectation of privacy, one must determine the degree of
intrusiveness"); compare United States v. Montano, 613 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (opening of suitcase constitutes a search); United States v. MacKay, 606 F.2d 264
(9th Cir. 1979) (same proposition); State v. Crutchfield, 123 Ariz. 570, 601 P.2d 333 (1979)
(same proposition); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979) (opening of brief-
case constitutes a search); Moran v. Morris, 478 F. Supp 145 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (same proposi-
tion); In re B.K.C., 413 A.2d 894 (D.C. 1980) (same proposition); United States v. Benson,
631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980) (opening of tote bag constitutes a search); People v. Minjares,
24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (same proposition), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
887 (1979); United States v. Bella, 605 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1979) (opening of guitar case
constitutes a search); State v. DeLong, 43 Or. App. 183, 602 P.2d 665 (1979) (opening of
camera case constitutes a search); Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(opening of purse constitutes a search) with United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518 (3d
Cir.) (opening of closed satchel does not constitute a search), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909
(1979); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (opening of taped
electric razor case does not constitute a search); Wyss v. State, 262 Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141
(1977) (opening of closed but unlocked toolbox does not constitute a search).
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container found in a properly stopped automobile violates a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" demonstrates, in a fairly dramatic
fashion, the perils and ambiguities of the test.
IV. KATZ AND CONTAINERS: PRIVACY THEORY STUMBLES UPON
REALITY
In Carroll v. United States57 the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed what became known as the "automobile exception" to the
fourth amendment's warrant clause. The Carroll decision laid the
groundwork for a lengthy, confusing-and ultimately fruit-
less-judicial struggle to apply consistently Katz' "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" test to concrete fact situations.
In Carroll the Court held that "a warrantless search of an au-
tomobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to be-
lieve the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ' 58 The Carroll de-
cision, as such, did not address the question pertinent to this Arti-
cle: whether stopping and examining the car constituted a
"search. '59 The Court assumed a "search" had occurred and con-
cluded that the search was substantively reasonable under what
became known as the "automobile exception" to the warrant
clause. The Court, however, did not "explicitly address the scope
of the search that [was] permissible" under the "automobile excep-
tion," 60 and in later cases the Court attempted to draw lines defin-
ing when the fourth amendment would permit the opening of vari-
ous closed containers found by police in properly stopped cars. 1
The Court's placement of those lines depended on whether open-
ing particular containers violated a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. '62 The resulting boundaries soon resembled a patchwork
quilt.
In United States v. Chadwick"3 the Court first applied a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" analysis to container searches.
There, federal officers became suspicious that a large footlocker
57. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
58. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982), citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
59. See supra note 3.
60. Ross, 456 U.S. at 799-800.
61. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
62. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 432-33 (Powell, J., concurring), citing United States v. Man-
nino, 635 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st
Cir. 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1980).
63. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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contained marijauna as they watched it being loaded onto a train
for Boston. Upon the locker's arrival a trained dog sniffed the foot-
locker and signalled the presence of the drug. Federal narcotics
agents, however, did not seize the footlocker immediately but
waited until it was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's automobile,
at which time they arrested Chadwick, seized the trunk, and
moved it to a secured location where the agents opened and
searched it.' Although the government did not "contend that the
footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car [made opening the
trunk] an automobile search," the government did argue that the
rationale of the "automobile search cases demonstrates the reason-
ableness of permitting warrantless searches of luggage."65 The
Court rejected the government's argument, reasoning that, while
one may have a "lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects,""6 the "factors
which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply
to [Chadwick's] footlocker" because luggage "is intended as a re-
pository of personal effects. '6 7 Thus, Chadwick held the opening of
a closed container taken from a car may violate a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" when such a container "is intended as a re-
pository of personal effects." '
The Court expanded Chadwick's rationale in Arkansas v.
Sanders6 There, state police officers stopped a taxicab after ob-
serving Sanders place a green suitcase, which the officers suspected
contained marijuana, in the trunk of the cab at the Little Rock
airport. The suitcase was seized and opened, revealing marijuana.
In contrast to the government's position in Chadwick, the State of
Arkansas explicitly argued that the "automobile exception" ap-
plied to the perusal of the suitcase. The State asserted that the
examination of any container found during a proper warrantless
64. Id. at 3-5.
65. Id. at 11-12.
66. Id. at 12, quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 13. The Court reasoned:
Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to a border entry
or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official scru-
tiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transpor-
tation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expec-
tations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.
Id.
68. Id.
69. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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search of an automobile was substantively reasonable.70 The Court
rejected the State's argument, concluding that "the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other par-
cels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an auto-
mobile. 11 1 The Court did state, however, that "[n]ot all containers
and packages found by police during the course of a search will
deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. 7 2 Whether
the opening of the given containers constituted a search would de-
pend upon the "nature" of the containers involved.7 3
Following Sanders, the lower federal courts embarked on a
confusing-and frustrating-effort to determine when the opening
of various containers during the course of an automobile search vi-
olated the owner's "reasonable expectation of privacy." The courts'
decisions soon turned upon fact-bound distinctions regarding the
"nature" of various containers and whether they were "intended as
repositories of personal effects." Some courts went so far as to ex-
tend fourth amendment protection to "worthy" containers-such
as suitcases and footlockers-but not to "unworthy" satchels such
as paper bags and plastic sacks.74 The obvious difficulties of this
approach culminated with the District of Columbia Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v. Ross. 7 5
In Ross a police officer properly stopped a car driven by Albert
Ross, upon a well-founded suspicion that Ross was engaged in nar-
cotics trafficking.7 " After placing Ross under arrest, the officer
opened the locked trunk of the car and found a "closed but un-
sealed brown paper sack about the size of a lunch bag and a zip-
70. Id. at 763-64.
71. Id. at 765 n.13.
72. Id. at 764 n.13.
73. Id. at 764-65 n.13. "[S]ome containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the
contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warrant."
Id. (emphasis added).
74. Compare United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1979) (plastic portfolio),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979)
(briefcase); United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979) (backpack); United States
v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979) (duffelbag) with United States v. Mannino, 635
F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980) (plastic bag inside paper bag); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d
697, 699 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[t]wo plastic bags, further in three brown paper bags, further in
two clear plastic bags"); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980) (paper bag);
United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979) (plastic bag); United States v. Neu-
mann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978) (cardboard box). See also cases cited supra note 56.
75. 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
76. Id. at 1162.
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pered red leather pouch. ' 7 The officer immediately opened the pa-
per sack and discovered a quantity of glassine envelopes containing
a white powder that later proved to be heroin. Sometime later he
opened the red leather pouch and found that it contained 3200
dollars in currency. 8 At trial, the government successfully rebuffed
Ross' motion to suppress the evidence found in the sack and the
pouch.9
On appeal a divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the opening of the leather pouch violated the fourth
amendment but that the opening of the sack did not.80 The panel
justified its result by relying upon a long line of circuit court cases
holding that the opening of "a suitcase, a briefcase, a purse, a duf-
fle bag, a backpack, a gym bag, a vinyl satchel, or a guitar case"
constituted unlawful searches because the intrusions infringed
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. The same line of cases,
however, also held that the opening of "an open knapsack, a taped
electric razor case, a toolbox, a closed but unsealed department
store box, or a closed but unsealed envelope" did not infringe upon
a reasonable expectation of privacy.81 Adding to the ambiguity of
its reasoning, the panel noted that it might have reached a differ-
ent result regarding the bag if, instead of leaving it open, Ross had
"sealed the paper bag shut."8 2
Obviously uneasy about the jurisprudential soundness of per-
mitting constitutional issues to turn upon inferences drawn from
distinctions between open paper bags, sealed bags, and leather
pouches, the District of Columbia Circuit voted to rehear the case
en banc.85 Noting that, "in the first and most important instance
the fourth amendment speaks to the police and must speak to
them intelligibly," the en banc court refused to validate the "fine
distinctions" created by the panel's "unworthy container" rule.8
Because attempts to determine whether particular containers sup-
ported reasonable expectations of privacy threatened to thrust the
police-and the courts-into an unmanageable vortex of factual
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1161 n.3.
81. Id. at 1175 nn.3 & 4 (Tamm, J., dissenting in part) (lengthy citations omitted).
Judge Tamm was the author of the original panel opinion. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 803 n.3.
82. Ross, 665 F.2d at 1161 n.3.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1170 n.27, quoting Amsterdam, supra note 44, at 403.
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complexity,85 the court concluded that the opening of any parcel
would constitute a "search," that demanded the police "delay [ex-
amination] of the parcels 'until after judicial approval has been
obtained.' ,86
Thus, faced with the daunting prospect of applying Katz'
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test to the opening of the myr-
iad types of containers found within automobiles, the District of
Columbia Circuit simply avoided the Katz test altogether. Without
either citation to or discussion of Katz, the court adopted a per se
rule mandating the judicial conclusion that a "search" had oc-
curred whenever police opened a "parcel. 8 7
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals."8 The
Court, however, agreed with the District of Columbia Circuit on
one important point: "a constitutional distinction between 'worthy'
and 'unworthy' containers would be improper."8 9 The Court re-
fused to accept the "proposition that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects only those containers that objectively manifest an individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy" because this proposition
necessarily would make the "propriety of a warrantless search...
turn on an objective appraisal of all the surrounding circum-
stances."90 Under such an analysis, while ordinary bags may not be
protected, a "paper bag stapled shut and marked 'private' might
be found to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as could
a cardboard box stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage."9'
85. The en banc court noted:
Size [of a container] could not be the dividing line [between reasonable and unreasona-
ble expectations of privacy], nor does the Government contend otherwise given its con-
cession that the leather pouch is encompassed by Sanders. A priceless bequest, great
grandmother's diary, for example, could be carried in a sack far smaller than one ac-
commodating jogging suit and sneakers. And if quality of materials is what counts, on
what side of the line would one place the variety of parcels people carry? Are police to
distinguish cotton purse from silk; felt, vinyl, canvas, tinfoil, cardboard, or paper con-
tainers from leather; sacks closed by folding a flap from those closed with zippers,
drawstrings, buttons, snaps, velcro fastenings, or strips of adhesive tape? Would a Tif-
fany shopping bag rank with one from the local supermarket?
Id. at 1170.
86. Id. at 1171, quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979).
87. The court expressed no opinion on the existence of a "search" if the contents of a
parcel were in "plain view" or the contents of the parcel could be "'inferred from their
outward appearance.'" Id. at 1170, quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.13. The court noted,
however, that "fo]rdinarily, one cannot infer from the density, shape, or size of a leather
pouch or opaque paper bag what is inside." Id. at 1170.
88. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
89. Id. at 822.
90. Id. at 822 n.30.
91. Id.
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The Court declined to make such distinctions.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, like the District of Columbia
Circuit, concluded-again, without citation to or discussion of
Katz-that application of a Katz analysis to the opening of con-
tainers would be inappropriate because the task would become ar-
bitrary, if not impossible.9 2 But, unlike the lower court, the Su-
preme Court avoided the Katz quandary by broadening the scope
of the automobile exception rather than by creating a "per se
search" rule applicable to the opening of all parcels: 3 "If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies
the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search."'
The decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit and the Su-
preme Court in Ross are remarkable because both courts re-
sponded to a reality not addressed specifically but nevertheless ap-
parent in both opinions: the fact that experience had shown the
open-ended Katz test to be judicially unmanageable when applied
to container searches. The District of Columbia Circuit avoided the
analytical difficulties of Katz by assuming the opening of any par-
cel satisfied the Katz requirements. The Supreme Court, in con-
trast, rendered the Katz analysis irrelevant; whatever an individ-
ual's expectation of privacy in a given container, that expectation
would "not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the
vehicle [carrying the container] is transporting contraband."" De-
spite the differences in approach, the conclusion of both courts re-
garding the applicability of Katz to the opening of containers is
clear. Both courts realized that, notwithstanding the theoretical
benefits of an open-ended "reasonable expectation of privacy"
analysis, its application to the real world of automobile
searches-involving as it does "an objective appraisal of all the
surrounding circumstances" 96-simply exacts too great a price.
92. Id.
93. In a manner somewhat similar to the approach of the D.C. Circuit, Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, reasoned that placing various containers on one side or the other of
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" line would be contrary to the "central purpose" of
the fourth amendment because that provision is designed to protect "frail cottage[s]" as
well as "majestic mansion[s]." Id. at 822. A per se rule applicable to the opening of "frail"
as well as "majestic" containers, however, might not command a majority of the Court. Two
sentences after his sweeping reference to the all-inclusive scope of the fourth, Justice Ste-
vens qualified that discussion with the observation that "the protection afforded by the
Amendment varies in different settings." Id. at 823.
94. Id. at 825.
95. Id. at 823.
96. Id. at 822 n.30.
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V. OLIVER, CIRAOLO, AND Dow: NARROWING THE RANGE OF
REASONABLENESS
Ross greatly simplified the fourth amendment analysis appli-
cable to the opening of containers taken from automobiles.9 7 Un-
fortunately, however, the jurisprudential and administrative diffi-
culties created by the open-ended "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test extend far beyond automobile searches. How are the
courts-and the police-to know when particular forms of surveil-
lance or information gathering outside the automobile search area
cross the Katz line and become subject to fourth amendment stric-
tures? For example, do photographs of an individual taken through
an open window violate the fourth amendment? Do observations of
a residential backyard made from the top of a telephone pole cross
the Katz line? What about observations from a high hill? An air-
plane? What if the observer uses a telescope? A microphone?
Again, the range of evidence arguably relevant to the analysis of
"reasonable expectations of privacy" in such situations appears
boundless.
But, beginning with its decision in Oliver v. United States,"8
and continuing with its opinions in California v. Ciraolo"9 and Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,100 the Supreme Court firmly sug-
gested that the range of factors impinging on the Katz analysis is
not limitless. Indeed, in these cases the Court construed the reach
of the fourth amendment by harking back to themes that many
thought Katz had interred safely in the sarcophagi of antique pre-
cedent. Oliver, Ciraolo, and Dow, in fact, demonstrate the Court's
de facto application of the tripartite analysis suggested by this
Article.
A. Oliver: Back to Protected Places?
In Oliver the Court considered two consolidated cases involv-
ing police intrusions upon rural marijuana patches. In both cases,
police officers, in their efforts to locate obscure cannabis gardens,
encroached upon rural property that was circled by fences and
97. Cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738, 743 (1987) (in conducting inventory search
of impounded van, the police need not "weigh the strength of the individual's privacy inter-
est in the container against the possibility that the container might serve as a repository for
dangerous or valuable items").
98. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
99. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
100. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
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posted with "No Trespassing" signs.1°1 The trial courts in both
cases granted the defendants' motions to suppress any evidence
obtained as a result of the trespasses, reasoning that the defend-
ants, by secluding their horticultural activities in remote woods
surrounded with fences and "No Trespassing" signs, had evidenced
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" that transformed the official
intrusions into unreasonable searches. 10 2 The Supreme Court
granted review in both cases,'03 and concluded that neither defend-
ant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their "open
fields.' 110 4
The Court's analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the Court
reaffirmed the holding of Hester v. United States that "the special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the
open fields."' 0 5 The unadorned language of the fourth amendment
provided the basis for this portion of the Court's opinion.106 The
Court, however, went on to examine the cases under Katz' "reason-
able expectation of privacy" test.'0 7
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that "[n]o single
factor" controls whether official surveillance "infringes upon indi-
vidual privacy."'' 08 When making that determination, Justice Pow-
ell wrote, courts should examine "the intention of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment," the "uses to which the individual has
put a location," and societal understandings "that certain areas de-
serve the most scrupulous protection from government inva-
sion."' 09 In applying that analysis to the cases before it, the Court
101. In Oliver Kentucky State Police "drove past petitioner's house to a locked gate
posted with a 'No Trespassing' sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents
walked around the gate and ... found a field of marihuana over a mile from petitioner's
home." 466 U.S. at 173. In the consolidated case of Maine v. Thornton, officers entered the
woods behind the defendant's house using a path between the residence and a neighboring
house. They followed a footpath through the woods until they reached two marijuana
patches fenced with chicken wire and posted with "No Trespassing" signs. Id. at 174-75.
102. Id. at 173-75.
103. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court's exclusion of the
evidence in Oliver, while the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had affirmed exclusion of the
marijuana in the second consolidated case. Id. at 174-75.
104. Id. at 176.
105. Id. at 176, quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). For a discus-
sion of Hester, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 177-81.
108. Id. at 177-78.
109. Id. at 178 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960)).
1098 [Vol. 40:1077
DEFINING PRIVACY
placed great-indeed, decisive-weight upon the location where
the official surveillance took place.
The Court's analysis distinguished private places, such as the
home, from more public places, such as open fields. Although the
fourth amendment "reflects the recognition of the Founders that
certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interfer-
ence," 110 the Court concluded that an open field is not such a
place. In contrast to the "overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of
the Republic,"11' open fields, according to the Court, "do not pro-
vide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment
is intended to shelter from government interference or surveil-
lance." '12 Nor is there any "societal interest in protecting the pri-
vacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur
in open fields."'1 3 In sum, the Court held that the defendants
lacked a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their marijuana
gardens because the gardens lay outside "the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life.' "1
Importantly, the Court rejected out of hand the assertion that
the existence of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" should be
determined by the circumstances of individual cases, such as the
presence of locked gates, "no trespassing" signs, or high fences.
Such an approach, the Court reasoned, would result in the devel-
opment of a "highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts
of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances
and hairline distinctions.""' 5 The Court found this result undesir-
able for two reasons. First, police would "have to guess before
every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently
high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located con-
traband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right of pri-
vacy."11 6 Second, such a technical analysis "creates a danger that
constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably en-
110. Id.
111. Id., quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 601.
112. Id. at 179.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 180, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
115. Id. at 181, quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981), quoting LaFave,
"Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures" The Robinson Dilemma,
1974 S. CT. REV. 127, 142.
116. Id.
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forced.'117 Thus, the Court rejected the suggestion that Katz re-
quires consideration of discrete, case-specific facts by concluding
that a broadly applicable rule-based on locations associated with
"intimate activity"'1 5-was the preferable approach.
B. Dow and Ciraolo: Does Intrusiveness and the Object of
Surveillance Matter?
Oliver caught some courts and commentators by surprise;
many assumed that Katz had implicitly overruled the "open
fields" doctrine and that doctrine's concomitant emphasis on con-
stitutionally protected locales. 19 But, if Oliver was rather unex-
pected, the aerial overflight decisions in California v. Ciraolo and
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States came as something of a revela-
tion. Those opinions suggest that, despite the contrary rhetoric of
Katz, courts must examine, along with a consideration of place, the
degree of official intrusiveness and the object of the governmental
surveillance.
In Ciraolo the Santa Clara police received an anonymous tele-
phone tip that marijuana was growing in Ciraolo's backyard. Of-
ficers were unable to observe the yard from ground level, however,
because two fences-an outer one six-feet high and an inner one
ten-feet high-completely obscured the view. The officers flew a
small aircraft over the backyard at an altitude of one thousand feet
and identified marijuana plants growing in the yard. Shortly there-
after the officers obtained a search warrant based on their eyewit-
ness aerial observations.1 20 When police executed the warrant a
117. Id. at 181-82.
118. Id. at 180.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976) ("It now
appears that Hester no longer has any independent meaning but merely indicates that open
fields are not areas in which one traditionally might reasonably expect privacy"), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Gangadean v. United States, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Magana,
512 F.2d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir.) (" '[A] reasonable expectation of privacy,' [standard], and not
common law property distinctions now controls the scope of the Fourth Amendment"), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); People v. McClaugherty, 193 Colo. 360, 362, 566 P.2d 361, 362
(1977) ("As a per se exception to the Fourth Amendment, the 'open fields' doctrine of Hes-
ter retains little vitality. . . the 'open fields' doctrine has been substantially undermined by
Katz . . ."); see also J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 3:19, at 73 (1982) ("Since the open
fields doctrine by definition deals with places, Hester appears at first blush to be in doubt or
at least somewhat limited"); W. LAFAVE supra, note 4, § 2.2(c), at 338-39; cf. United States
v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.
1968); Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1976); State v. Caldwell, 20 Ariz. App. 331,
512 P.2d 863 (1973); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973);
State v. Hanson, 113 N.H. 689, 313 A.2d 730 (1973).
120. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1810-11 (1986). The officers had attached a photograph
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day later, they seized seventy-three marijuana plants.121 The state
trial court denied Ciraolo's motion to suppress the marijuana as
the fruit of an unreasonable search, but the California Court of
Appeals reversed. The appeals court reasoned that Ciraolo had
manifested a "reasonable expectation of privacy" based on the
height and existence of the two fences. 2
In Dow, following an initial administrative inspection, the
company denied the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on-
site access for a second examination of two power plants located
upon the company's two thousand-acre manufacturing facility in
Midland, Michigan. The EPA, instead of seeking an administrative
warrant for the inspection, hired a pilot to take photographs of the
facility from altitudes of 12,000, 3000, and 1200 feet. When Dow
became aware of the surveillance, it brought suit in federal district
court alleging that the EPA's action violated the fourth amend-
ment.123 The district court granted Dow's motion for summary
judgment, reasoning that, because the configuration of buildings
and pipes photographed by the EPA constituted "trade secrets"
protected by state tort law, the government had violated the com-
pany's "reasonable expectation of privacy. 1 24
The Supreme Court's opinions in Ciraolo and Dow analyzed
three factors: the place where the surveillance occurred, 25 the de-
gree of intrusiveness of the surveillance,' 2 and the object of the
surveillance itself.12 7 The balance of these factors in both cases
of the backyard as an exhibit to the warrant affidavit. The parties, however, raised no argu-
ments before the Supreme Court based on the photograph, and the Court decided the case
on the assumption that the officers' observations, not the photograph, supported the war-
rant. Id. at 1812 n.1.
121. Id. at 1811.
122. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1984), rev'd,
106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986). Relying on reasoning similar to that discussed in the articles cited
supra note 51, the appeals court also concluded that the surveillance constituted a search
because the flyover "was not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any other legiti-
mate law enforcement or public safety objective, but was undertaken for the specific pur-
pose of observing this particular enclosure within defendant's curtilage." Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct.
at 1811, quoting Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The California
Supreme Court denied review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
123. Dow also argued that aerial surveillance was beyond the agency's statutory inves-
tigative authority. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Dow, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1824
(1986).
124. Id. at 1822-23. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
125. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812; Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
126. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813; Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
127. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813; Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
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yielded the conclusion that neither the aerial observation of mari-
juana in a suburban back yard nor the aerial photography of a
manufacturing facility constituted a "search." Significantly, the
Court's opinions strongly suggest that the result in both cases
would have differed if either the degree of intrusiveness or the ob-
ject of the governmental surveillance had varied from the facts
presented.
1. Place
As in Oliver, the Supreme Court discussed at some length the
locales surveilled in Ciraolo and Dow, although Chief Justice Bur-
ger's analysis of "place" ultimately was not decisive in either case.
Ciraolo involved police observation of the curtilage, an area found
to be "intimately linked to the home, both physically and psycho-
logically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.' 1 28 Dow,
on the other hand, involved police photography of an outdoor
manufacturing facility, a place that the Court found did not trigger
the exacting constitutional scrutiny appropriate for intrusions into
the home and its curtilage. 129
The Court's actual categorization of the "places" concerned in
both cases is hardly precedent setting. Oliver already had reaf-
firmed the primacy accorded the home and its curtilage under the
fourth amendment,3 0 and the Court's rejection of Dow's assertion
that an "industrial curtilage" is entitled to "constitutional protec-
tion equivalent to that of the curtilage of a private home" was
fairly predictable.' 3' Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's analysis
of "place" in both cases is important for two somewhat more sub-
tle reasons.
First, the discussion of "place" served as the foundation for
the fourth amendment analysis in both cases. Although the Court
had previously recognized-as it did, for example, in Oliver-that
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test may "often" require
"reference[] to a 'place,' ,,132 the opinions in Ciraolo and Dow both
spent significant time with "place" even though the fourth amend-
ment question in each case ultimately turned on other factors. The
128. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
129. The Court categorized Dow's plant as falling somewhere between the "curtilage"
and "open field" classifications-although the open areas involved "were more analogous to
'open fields' than to a curtilage for purposes of aerial observation." Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
130. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
131. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Court's discussion of "place" despite its nondecisive role in Ciraolo
and Dow suggests not that "reasonable expectation of privacy"
analysis will "often" require reference to a place, but rather that
the analysis may in fact always require such reference."3
Second, the Court's discussion of "place" built upon the rea-
soning set out in Oliver; it did not turn upon abstract geographical
constructs or cold generalizations drawn from seventeenth-century
decisions. In Ciraolo the Court emphasized that the boundaries of
the curtilage as a protected "place" are determined by "the area to
which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life.' "'34 The Court similarly
held in Dow that the owner of an "industrial curtilage" could not
claim analogous protection because the "intimate activities associ-
ated with family privacy and the home ... simply do not reach
the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a
manufacturing plant."13 5 Thus, the Court focused not upon
"places" as such, but instead upon the types of human conduct
likely to occur in particular locales. The fourth amendment pro-
tects "people, not places," ' and the Court quite plainly used
"place" not as a physical limitation on the scope of the fourth
amendment but as an analytical tool to determine what conduct
and activities people reasonably could assume would remain
private.
2. Intrusion
The Court's explicit reliance on the nonintrusive nature of ae-
rial surveillance was perhaps the most surprising element of the
fourth amendment analysis in both Ciraolo and Dow-at least to
the dissenting Justice Powell.' Although the aerial observation at
issue in Ciraolo involved a place "where privacy expectations are
most heightened,' 3 8 the Court concluded that this observation did
not constitute a search, at least in part, because it "took place
within public navigable airspace .. .in a physically nonintrusive
133. See, e.g., Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974) ("The maxim of
Katz that the fourth amendment protects 'people not places' is only of limited usefulness,
for in considering what people can reasonably expect to maintain as private we must inevi-
tably speak in terms of places").
134. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812, quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, quoting Boyd, 116
U.S. at 630.
135. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
136. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
137. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815; Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1831-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
138. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
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manner."13 Similarly, in Dow the Court emphasized that the case
involved "aerial observation ... without physical entry."'140
These references are not the first time in recent years that the
Court has relied upon the absence of a direct physical intrusion as
a ground of decision under the fourth amendment,1 4 1 and they can-
not be dismissed as dicta or mere "asides." On the contrary, in
light of Ciraolo and Dow, the degree of intrusiveness appears to be
a central factor in the Court's analysis. The Court explicitly stated
that "actual physical entry ... into any enclosed area" or the use
of "some unique sensory device that ... could penetrate the walls
of buildings" would "raise very different and far more serious
questions" than those before it.1 42
The Court's somewhat unexpected reliance upon "physical in-
trusion" provoked sharp dissenting comment by Justice Powell.
"[A] standard that defines a Fourth Amendment 'search' by refer-
ence to whether police have physically invaded a 'constitutionally
protected area,'" he wrote, "provides no real protection against
surveillance techniques made possible through technology. '143
Chief Justice Burger defended the majority's position by turning
to the third-and arguably decisive-factor in the Court's analysis:
the nature of the information sought and obtained as a result of
the official surveillance.
3. Object
The Chief Justice's opinion in Ciraolo emphasized the dissimi-
larities of the governments' observations in Ciraolo and Katz. The
Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, Chief Justice
Burger reasoned, was developed in the context of electronic inter-
ception of interpersonal conversation.1 4 4 A rule designed to protect
the privacy of conversation, he wrote, "does not translate readily
into a rule of constitutional dimensions that one who grows illicit
drugs" is entitled to assume that such activities will remain free of
139. Id. at 1813.
140. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826 (emphasis in original).
141. For example, in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), the Court ex-
amined the question of whether a "canine sniff" by a trained narcotics detection dog consti-
tuted a "search." The Court concluded that it did not, at least in part because such a sniff
was "much less intrusive than a typical search." Id. at 707; see also United States v. Jacob-
sen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
142. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
143. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1813.
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official observation. 14 5 Protecting the privacy of conversations in-
volves a stronger constitutional interest than maintaining the se-
crecy of physical objects located in suburban backyards.
The Court's opinion in Dow further emphasized the signifi-
cance of the object of the surveillance. There, the Court stressed
that the information obtained by the EPA concerned simple physi-
cal details regarding the layout of the manufacturing facility. The
photographs, the Court stated, "are not so revealing of intimate
details as to raise constitutional concerns. ' 146 Dow would have im-
plicated "more serious privacy concerns" if the government sur-
veillance had uncovered "confidential discussion of chemical for-
mulae" or if the photographs themselves had recorded
"identifiable human faces or secret documents. 1 47 Because the
EPA, however, obtained only physical data-not intimate confi-
dential details-from its surveillance, the Court concluded that no
constitutional "search" had occurred.
Viewed from the tripartite perspective discussed above, the
Court's analysis in Ciraolo and Dow is straightforward. Just as it
had in Oliver, the Court rejected assertions that the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test required it to consider discrete eviden-
tiary and legal matters, such as the height of Ciraolo's fences,1 48
the subjective intent of the officers conducting the surveillance, 49
the impact of state tort law,1 50 or the use of relatively standard
aerial photographic techniques. 151 Even though such factors may
be logically relevant to the Katz inquiry in a given case, 52 the
Court rejected ad hoc balancing. Instead, the cases turned upon
the application of three broadly applicable analytical constructs.
First, the Court placed the governmental surveillance in each
case in the context where it occurred. It then inquired whether the
government had made a constitutionally offensive intrusion into
that place. Finally, the Court focused upon the nature of the infor-
mation obtained as a result of the surveillance. In both Ciraolo and
Dow, the last two factors-the nature of the intrusion and the in-
145. Id.
146. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
147. Id. at 1827 n.5.
148. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
149. Id. at 1813 n.2.
150. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1823, 1827 n.6.
151. Id. at 1826-27.
152. Justice Powell observed that state trade secrets law would proscribe private-party
photography of Dow's plant thus providing "support for [Dow's] claim that society recog-
nizes commercial privacy interests as reasonable." Id. at 1832 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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formation obtained-determined the result. And, Justice Powell to
the contrary, the Court's analysis does not appear wooden, blind to
reality, or bound to a "single fact."'153 Indeed, had the balance of
the last two factors been different in either case-if, for example,
the aerial surveillance had involved technology capable of intrud-
ing within walls or seizing intimate information such as human
faces or conversations-the Court almost certainly would have de-
cided the cases differently.14
Oliver, Ciraolo and Dow could alter significantly the Katz
analysis. Despite the Katz assertion that fourth amendment rights
do not depend upon an analysis of "constitutionally protected
area[s]," the Court has now concluded that focused probing for
secluded marijuana fields is not a "search" because the "special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not ex-
tended to the open fields.' 5 ' Notwithstanding Katz' conclusion
that the scope of the fourth amendment "cannot turn" upon "the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion,"'157 the Court now has
determined that the aerial surveillance of a backyard 58 or a com-
mercial facility'59 does not involve a "search" because it is "physi-
cally nonintrusive."'ns Finally, the Court's suggestion that the in-
terception of interpersonal communication or other intimate facts
raises concerns more worthy of constitutional protection than mere
observation of physical details' demonstrates that "privacy" in-
volves more than subjective desires-the very nature of the object,
undertaking or activity sought to be shielded from official scrutiny
plays an important part in the Katz calculus.
Commentators have criticized the apparent inconsistencies
and seeming tensions between the Court's recent decisions and
Katz.'62 In an article circulated the day after the aerial surveillance
153. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
154. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813; Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
155. 389 U.S. at 350.
156. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176, quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
157. 389 U.S. at 353.
158. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1809.
159. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1819.
160. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813; see also Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826 ("[t]he narrow issue
raised by Dow's claim of search and seizure ... concerns aerial observation ... without
physical entry") (emphasis in original).
161. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813; Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
162. For example, several commentators have lamented the Supreme Court's reexami-
nation of the Hester "open fields" doctrine in Oliver. See, e.g., Note, Supreme Court's
Treatment of Open Fields: A Comment on Oliver and Thornton, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 637
(1984); Note, Oliver v. United States: Good Fences Make Good Open Fields, 11 J. CoNraM-
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cases were handed down, the Washington Post reported that the
Court may be "letting the government eviscerate constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches through the use of mod-
ern technology. ' 16 3 Justice Powell, in dissents joined by three other
members of the Court, was more blunt. The reasoning of the ma-
jority in Ciraolo and Dow, he wrote, "simply repudiates Katz.'' 64
The true impact of the Court's most recent fourth amendment
pronouncements is, of course, obscure at this point. That the deci-
sions deviate at least somewhat from the rhetoric of Katz is appar-
ent. But whether-as Justice Powell asserted-they signal a repu-
diation of Katz' general approach to search and seizure analysis is
more questionable. Instead, the decisions may well mark, not a de-
parture from Katz, but rather a developing maturity in the Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence under that case. The Court's re-
cent decisions suggest that, far from abandoning the Katz "reason-
ableness" test, the Court is giving the test some identifiable con-
tent; the decisions have begun to indicate "where [the
'reasonableness'] line is . . . to be drawn."'6 5 Thus, while the pri-
mary fourth amendment inquiry in determining whether a search
has occurred remains that mandated by Katz-that is, has the
government intruded upon a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy?-Oliver, Ciraolo, and Dow demonstrate the Court's recogni-
tion that certain identifiable factors, well established and long ap-
plied in fourth amendment jurisprudence, channel the ultimate
resolution of that question.
VI. PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE: THE ESTABLISHED ELEMENTS OF A
"SEARCH"
The most challenging, and certainly the most crucial, aspect of
the Katz analysis is whether a court can legitimize a particular,
subjective expectation of privacy as "reasonable." As discussed
above, the task has at times seemed distressingly unmanageable.
This much is clear: "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law
PORARY L. 531 (1985); Note, The Return to Open Season for the Police in the Open Field,
Oliver v. United States, 50 Mo. L. REv. 425 (1985); Note, Criminal Procedure-Oliver v.
United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C.L. REv. 546 (1985); Note,
Oliver v. United States: Open Fields and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 1985 UTAH L.
REV. 463.
163. Marcus, Aerial Surveillance Powers Broadened, Wash. Post, May 20, 1986, at Al,
col. 5, & at A10, col. 1.
164. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1831 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at
1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
165. NWC Report, supra note 50, at 204.
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must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society."'16  Given
such a scanty analytical framework, the proliferation of opinions
regarding the legitimation of privacy interests is hardly
surprising. 167
Oliver, Ciraolo, and Dow are almost certain to stir the privacy
debate once more. Even before the current round of decisions,
some writers warned that "emphasis on property rights provides
serious opportunity for courts to limit fourth amendment protec-
tions.""6 " The Court's new reliance not only on property rights but
on intrusiveness and the object of the surveillance itself will likely
prompt further predictions that constitutional law is receding into
darker times.
But whether courts and commentators should mourn these de-
velopments is questionable. Even critics of the Court's recent utili-
zation of "property rights" recognize that fourth amendment con-
struction under a broadly based, fact-bound "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test is "almost wholly dependent upon the
political and social climate and personal judicial leanings.' 6 9 The
three-part analysis suggested by the Court's recent opinions can be
viewed as a serious-and meritorious-attempt to avoid impres-
sionistic resolution of constitutional issues by instead basing the
fourth amendment's definition of a "search" upon neutral princi-
ples.170 The Court's newly emerging test represents a distillation of
its experience with the definition of a "search" under the fourth
amendment and, although the test is based on historic precedent,
it is "an affirmation of the special values [the amendment] em-
bod[ies] rather than.., a finite rule of law, its limits fixed by the
consensus of a century long past.'' 1
The three conceptual inquiries used by the Court have, at the
very least, the merit of long judicial standing. As developed above,
166. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
167. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
168. Mickenberg, supra note 25, at 226.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1959) (although the Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment should
not "freeze[] for all time the common law of search and of arrest as it prevailed when the
amendment was adopted," a principled Supreme Court decision should rest upon "reasons
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved").
171. Id. at 19.
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judicial concern with "place" and "physical intrusion" extend back
into the eighteenth century. The genealogy of the third factor,
which focuses on the object of the governmental surveillance, is
more recent-although since Katz no one can doubt its impor-
tance. Moreover, in cases both before and after the development of
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, the Court consistently
has utilized the place or context of a governmental intrusion, the
nature of the intrusion itself, and the object of the governmental
surveillance as three implicit, often interrelated, scales upon which
to judge the merit of a fourth amendment claim. If tempered by
the Katz orientation toward the protection of personal rights,
these three constructs can provide a lattice-work upon which the
currently sprawling vine of fourth amendment "search" analysis
can begin to find direction.
A. The Protected Place: From Houses to Fields
The explicit judicial use of "place" as a valid analytical factor
in fourth amendment decisions still is recovering, to some extent,
from the much-quoted proclamation of Katz that the amendment
"protects people, not places. ' 17 2 Taken at face value, this assertion
appears to reject the significance of "place" in fourth amendment
analysis. The Katz gloss, however, must be read in light of the lit-
eral language of the amendment, with its explicit protection of the
"right of the people to be secure in their ... houses,' '173 and with
an eye to subsequent cases which clarify the actual application of
the Katz dictum.
Barely a year after deciding Katz, the Court emphatically re-
affirmed the significance of the home as a constitutionally signifi-
cant "place" in Alderman v. United States.17 4 The opinion dis-
posed of three consolidated cases concerning electronic
interception of interpersonal conversations. Although the facts of
the consolidated cases did not establish where the electronic sur-
veillance occurred, 1 5 the Court analyzed all three cases as if the
172. 389 U.S. at 351.
173. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 169 n.6 ("This Court frequently has relied on the
explicit language of the Fourth Amendment as delineating the scope of its affirmative pro-
tections") (citations omitted).
174. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
175. In the first case, brought by petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, the government
had electronically surveilled Alderisio's place of business. Id. at 167. In the other two cases
the government "admit[ted] overhearing conversations of each petitioner, but where the
surveillance took place and other pertinent details are unknown." Id. at 170 n.3.
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government had intercepted the conversations within the confines
of a home.1 76 The precise issue confronting the Court was whether
only the participants in the intercepted conversations had been
subjected to a "search," or whether the owner of the premises
surveilled also had a constitutional complaint, despite the fact that
he may not have participated in the intercepted conversations. 17
Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's emphatic dissent that only the
participants in the surveilled conversations had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in those conversations, and that any other
conclusion would be tantamount to holding "that the Fourth
Amendment protects 'houses' as well as 'persons,' ,p178 the Court
concluded that, on the facts before it, a "search" occurred when-
ever the government overheard "conversations of a petitioner him-
self or conversations occurring on his premises, whether or not he
was present or participated in those conversations. '179
The Court rejected the argument that, so long as the conversa-
tional privacy of the actual participants is protected, the fourth
amendment does not protect "the homeowner against the use of
third-party conversations overheard on his premises."180 The
homeowner plainly has an expectation of privacy in his own con-
versations, but he also has the constitutional right to expect that
his home will be free from unauthorized governmental intrusion.
Although the homeowner may have no interest in the seized con-
versations "as 'effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment," he or
she does have a valid constitutional complaint because the seized
conversations were the fruits of an unauthorized search of his
house, which is itself expressly protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." e Katz, the Court concluded, "by holding that the Fourth
176. Id. at 176-80.
177. The Court analyzed the issue as one of "standing," that is, whether the individual
raising the fourth amendment claim had been personally aggrieved such that he could in-
voke the exclusionary rule. Id. at 171-74; id. at 188-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980) (holding that defendants charged with crimes of possession had "automatic standing"
to challenge legality of searches producing evidence against them regardless of their owner-
ship of the evidence seized or the premises searched). In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139
(1978), the Court abandoned any "theoretically separate. . . concept of standing" to con-
test an allegedly illegal search "in favor of an inquiry that focuse[s] directly on the sub-
stance of the defendant's claim that he or she possessed a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'
in the area searched." See also Rawlins v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
178. 394 U.S. at 191-92, 194.
179. Id. at 176.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 177.
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Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was
[not] intended to withdraw any of the protection which the
Amendment extends to the home."1 2
Other cases turning on the "place" where the governmental
surveillance occurred followed Alderman.18 3 These cases illustrate
that, "by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether aban-
doned use of property concepts in determining the presence or ab-
sence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.118 4
But if Katz did not eliminate the relevance of "place" in
fourth amendment analysis or withdraw any of the protection tra-
ditionally afforded the home, Katz did, nonetheless, redefine the
nature of the locational inquiry. Before Katz, the home was pro-
tected simply because it was the home, which, under literal fourth
amendment terms, constituted a protected place. After Katz, the
home is a protected locale, not only by virtue of its explicit men-
tion in the language of the fourth amendment, but also (and per-
haps primarily) because of the human activities innately associated
182. Id. at 180.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987) (a barn located 60 yards
from a house is not within the "curtilage" and federal agents did not need a warrant to
examine its outer perimeter); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408 (1984) (warrantless
entry into a public lobby of a hotel to serve a subpoena is not the sort of act forbidden by
the fourth amendment); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (a search war-
rant, not merely an arrest warrant, is necessary under the fourth amendment for the search
of a home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (The fourth amendment pro-
hibits police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in
order to make a routine felony arrest. "The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's
privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone
that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms"); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499 (1978) (fourth amendment applies even to burned premises, and a search warrant is
required even when there is a suspicion of arson); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976) (a person standing in a doorway to a home, exposed to public view, is in a "public
place" for purposes of the fourth amendment, and her retreat into her home could not
thwart an otherwise proper arrest); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (the reasona-
bleness of a search and seizure depends upon the facts of each case, and the reasonableness
of a search of an automobile may be different from the search of a home or other fixed
place); accord United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Sifuentes v. United States, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (Martinez-
Fuerte and Sifuentes were consolidated appeals); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (sus-
pected drug deal outside home could not justify search of house, because "only in a few...
well delineated situations . . . may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause to conduct it") (quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
184. Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
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with it. As the Court recently noted: "The sanctity of the home is
not to be disputed. But the home is sacred in Fourth Amendment
terms not primarily because of the occupants' possessory interests
in the premises, but because of their privacy interests in the activi-
ties that take place within."'185
Katz sought to avoid a literal application of the fourth amend-
ment in terms of "places" that would risk protecting the place in-
stead of the person. However, recognition that a place is "pro-
tected" in fourth amendment terms because it is the context for
intimate human activities avoids that danger without ignoring the
language of the Constitution.'86 Thus, the determination whether
any given locale legitimizes an expectation of privacy rests not on
whether the "place" can be distinguished, categorized, and given a
constitutionally significant geographic label, but rather whether it
is conceptually linked with intimacy and personal privacy. 87
Viewed in the above light, a conceptual scale emerges to legiti-
mize an expectation of privacy in terms of place. At one end, where
the "zone of privacy" is most "clearly defined,"' 88 is the home. At
the other end, where privacy interests associated with a "place" are
most attenuated, is the "open field."' 8 9 The polar extremes of this
scale alone may determine whether particular governmental sur-
veillance infringes upon a "reasonable expectation of privacy" and
therefore constitutes a search; crossing a home's threshold is a
search, climbing over fences in forested woods is not. 90
185. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (emphasis in original).
186. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 n.6 (1984) (the effect of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test was not to "sever Fourth Amendment doctrine
from the Amendment's language," but to recognize that "the Court fairly may respect the
constraints of the Constitution's language without wedding itself to an unreasoning literal-
ism"); see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 589-90 (1980); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 178-80 (1969).
187. In United States v. Dunn, for example, the Court was presented with a claim
that a barn located 60 yards from a residential dwelling was within the "curtilage" of the
home and was therefore a "place" entitled to exacting fourth amendment protection. 107 S.
Ct. at 1139. The Court concluded that whether a given "place" qualifies as "curtilage" de-
pends upon "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area
is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses of which the
area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by." Id. Applying that analysis to the facts before it, the Court found that
the barn simply was not an area "associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life,'" and rejected the assertion that the warrantless examination of its outer
perimeter constituted a search. Id., quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
188. Payton, 455 U.S. at 589.
189. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-81.
190. Compare Payton, 455 U.S. at 589-90 with Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-81.
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Between these two extremes lies a broad variety of locales
that, depending upon the strength of their conceptual link with
interpersonal intimacy and privacy, may validate an expectation of
privacy. Indeed, the degree to which various places within this
"middle range" legitimize an expectation of privacy turns upon the
closeness of their connection to the "peculiarly strong concepts of
intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated with the
home." 191 The "automobile exception" to the fourth amendment's
warrant clause, for example, rests at least in part upon the conclu-
sion that an automobile is a "place" which, because of its mobility
and other inherent characteristics, substantially lacks any such
association. 192
Factors such as the pervasiveness of governmental regulation
of certain locales and the types of activities generally conducted
there are relevant to whether a given "place" merits rigorous con-
stitutional protection. Thus, although the amendment's protection
may extend to commercial premises because the "word 'houses,' as
it appears in the Amendment, is not to be taken literally," the "ex-
pectation of privacy that the owner of a commercial property en-
joys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity ac-
corded an individual's home."' 9 This differentiation between
residential and commercial premises is due, at least in part, to a
"long tradition of close government supervision" of commercial
premises which undermines any claim that such places are the loci
for intimate personal activities.194 Some locales, moreover, by their
very nature are only remotely connected with established notions
of intimacy or interpersonal privacy. As the Court noted in Oliver,
"open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government inter-
191. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1823 (1986), quoting Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1984). Compare Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968) ("the protection of the Amendment may extend to commercial
premises") with G.M. Leasing v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (a business, by virtue of
its special nature, may be open to intrusions that would be impermissible in a private con-
text), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) and See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (com-
mercial premises may be inspected in many more situations than private residences). See
also United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 n.4 (1987) (a barn located 60 yards from a
private residence does not "harbor[] those intimate activities associated with domestic life
and the privacies of the home").
192. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 388-90 (1985) (holding that a motor
home, because of its mobility and regulation as a motor vehicle, falls within the "automobile
exception").
193. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 367.
194. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1978).
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ference or surveillance" because there is "no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of
crops, that occur in open fields.' 119 5
Between the polar extremes of "homes" and "open fields,"
however, the locational inquiry rarely determines the "search" is-
sue; the "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis generally
hinges on two other factors. Apparently, the presence or absence of
an actual physical intrusion has been decisive in cases involving
alleged searches of commercial premises. 9 6 The object of the offi-
cial surveillance also has determined the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" issue in cases concerning other "places" falling some-
where between homes and open fields.'97 It is to the first of these
factors, the degree of intrusiveness of the governmental surveil-
lance, that attention is now turned.
B. Physical Intrusion: From the Person to the Skies
Following Katz, the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion ostensibly ceased to be the focal point of fourth amendment
analysis. Yet, while the Court's conclusion that "the reach of [the
fourth amendment] cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion"'9 8 put to rest a rigid calculus hopelessly inept
in the face of advancing technology, the inherent intrusiveness of
governmental surveillance does remain relevant to the determina-
tion whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been in-
fringed. Although the Court is wary of any suggestion that a physi-
cal intrusion is "necessary [or] sufficient to establish a
195. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179; cf. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1140 (a barn was not a "place"
entitled to stringent fourth amendment protection because it "was not being used for inti-
mate activities of the home").
196. Compare Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 370 (physical entry into business office violates
reasonable expectation of privacy) with Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1825-26 (although actual surveil-
lance of the interior of buildings would raise more serious constitutional concerns, aerial
surveillance of business premises does not infringe upon a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy); compare Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (wide-ranging exami-
nation of printed materials offered for sale by "adult" bookstore constitutes a "search";
"because a retail store invites the public to enter, it [does not] consent to wholesale searches
and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees") with Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-71 (1985) (purchase of magazine offered for sale by "adult" book-
store does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy).
197. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (interception of conver-
sation from telephone booth constitutes a search) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741
(1979) (use of a pen register to obtain the telephone numbers dialed from a specific tele-
phone does not constitute a search because "pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications") (emphasis in original).
198. 389 U.S. at 353.
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constitutional violation," the Court nevertheless has acknowledged
that a physical intrusion is at least "marginally relevant to the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated." 199
Recent cases have gone further, relying upon the absence of a
physical intrusion as an express analytical factor. 00
Indeed, Katz itself may have retained the essential nugget of
an "intrusiveness" inquiry. The majority opinion stated: "[what] a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." '' If this
element of Katz is interpreted (as it often has been) to require a
"subjective expectation of privacy" as a foundation for fourth
amendment protection,02 the Court's reasoning carries the seeds of
the amendment's own destruction-the amendment could be nulli-
fied by a simple governmental announcement that all expectations
of privacy are henceforth unreasonable.0 3 If, however, courts read
this "knowing exposure" prong of Katz as requiring a constitution-
ally objectionable intrusion upon personal interests as the predi-
cate for fourth amendment protection, they avoid the above anom-
aly. Fourth amendment protection in an individual case might turn
upon whether a person has "knowingly exposed" otherwise private
information, 20  but the analysis does not hinge upon the presence
199. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984).
200. See California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826-27 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-24
(1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
201. 389 U.S. at 351.
202. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence, where he stated that, to invoke
fourth amendment protection, an individual must have "an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
203. For example, one commentator states:
"[A]n actual subjective expectation of privacy" . . . can neither add to, nor can its
absence detract from, an individual's claim to Fourth Amendment protection. If it
could, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy
merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a
decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance.
Amsterdam, supra note 44, at 384. Significantly, just three years after Katz, Justice Harlan
expressed doubts about the wisdom of engrafting a "subjective expectation of privacy" re-
quirement upon fourth amendment "search" analysis. See United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("While [the expectations approach of Katz] ...
represent[s] an advance over the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law, [it]
too hals] [its] limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for
analysis").
204. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (an individual can-
not claim fourth amendment protection for information that he voluntarily has disclosed to
a third party) (superseded by statute as stated in Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 209 (D.
D.C. 1980)); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (same proposition); United
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or absence of a manipulable "subjective expectation of privacy."
Rather, the predicate to constitutional protection is the presence
or absence of a governmental "intrusion." Information that an in-
dividual knowingly exposes or voluntarily discloses to the govern-
ment or its agents has not been obtained by means of an "intru-
sion" and is therefore not within the bulwark against official
intrusiveness erected by the fourth amendment.
That the Court is more concerned with "intrusiveness" than
actual subjective expectations of privacy is suggested by the recent
opinions in Ciraolo and Dow. Although the Court discussed briefly
in both cases whether Ciraolo and Dow possessed subjective expec-
tations of privacy, 0 5 that discussion, while somewhat cryptic, sug-
gests that the Court, in looking to such expectations, emphasizes
intrusiveness more than subjective anticipation. The Court did not
undertake any substantial analysis of the actual, subjective expec-
tations of Ciraolo and Dow Chemical. Rather, it simply concluded
that there had been in each case at least a minimal governmental
intrusion to obtain information that both parties had attempted to
keep private. The Court's approach is thus consistent with its ear-
lier observations that the "overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against un-
warranted intrusion by the State. '20 6
Indeed, as with the "place" analysis discussed above, Katz
now can be understood not as eliminating the relevance of physical
intrusion, but rather as shifting the emphasis placed on that ana-
lytical element. Just as Katz infused the "place" inquiry with a
concern for personal intimacy rather than geographical location, it
similarly redirected the "intrusion" inquiry. Fourth amendment
cases no longer turn upon whether a thumbtack physically pene-
trates a protected enclave;207 nevertheless, their resolution may
well depend upon whether a given form of surveillance impermissi-
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (same proposition); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (same proposition).
205. See Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (noting that it "can reasonably be assumed" that
Ciraolo had some expectation of privacy "from at least street level views," although whether
he "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard
... is not entirely clear in these circumstances"); Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826 n.4 (finding it
"important" that, although Dow had taken "elaborate and expensive measures for ground
security," the surveillance occurred in "an area where Dow ha[d] made [no] effort to protect
against aerial surveillance") (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312
(6th Cir. 1984)).
206. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
207. See. e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (slight intrusion by
a "spike microphone" is an "actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area").
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bly intrudes upon the person. For it "is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty, and private property."2 '
Like the "place" construct, the Court's cases dealing with "in-
trusion" can be placed on a scale; at one end lie those intrusions
which almost certainly violate a reasonable expectation of privacy
and at the other end lie those intrusions which do not. And, as
with the "place" scale, the "intrusion" scale's polar ends now seem
well defined. An actual, physical intrusion upon the person-such
as the insertion of a needle to draw a blood sample-quite clearly
constitutes a search.20 9 At the other end of the "intrusion" scale
are cases involving the voluntary disclosure of information to the
government where, because data is "knowingly expose[d],"21 0 no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" is violated.211
In between lie numerous cases where the inherent intrusive-
ness of government surveillance influences, but does not alone
determine, whether a search has occurred. In this middle ground,
generically similar cases can differ in result depending upon the
perceived intrusiveness of the governmental conduct at issue. Two
cases concerning the seizure of pornographic materials from adult
bookstores, Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York2"2 and Maryland v. Ma-
con,21 - are illustrative.
In Lo-Ji a town justice issued a blank warrant authorizing the
208. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
209. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (the administration of blood tests "plainly
constitute[s] searches of 'persons' ").
210. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
211. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 119, § 4:3 (discussing "consent" cases where, by
voluntarily consenting to an intrusion, a suspect gives up any expectation of privacy); see
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (strip search of person suspected of
being a drug courier upheld when the totality of circumstances showed search was volun-
tary); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (search producing the fruits of a bank
robbery was valid when consent was given by common law wife of suspect); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (wife may consent to a search of common areas of house,
which produces evidence against husband); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)
(consensual entry of undercover police officer to purchase drugs which produced evidence of
crime and incriminating conversations did not violate fourth amendment); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (incriminating statements obtained by an IRS agent wearing a
body microphone violated no fourth amendment interests when the agent was admitted
with defendant's consent); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (conversation ob-
tained by a government informant wearing a hidden mike was not violative of the fourth
when the informant was on the premises with the suspect's consent).
212. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
213. 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
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seizure of pornographic materials. The justice then accompanied
police officers to the adult bookstore, and, during a six-hour exami-
nation of the store's wares, filled in the blank warrant with partic-
ular descriptions of the items seized. The Court struck down this
warrant procedure as "reminiscent of the general warrant or writ
of assistance of the eighteenth century. '214 New York, however, ar-
gued that, even though the warrant procedure may have been de-
fective, no warrant was in fact needed because the state's entry
into the bookstore did not constitute a "search." The state's sug-
gestion was "that by virtue of its display of the items at issue to
the general public in areas of its store open to them, [Lo-Ji] had no
legitimate expectation of privacy against governmental
intrusion. 215
Maryland raised a similar argument in Macon. There, three
county police detectives visited the Silver News adult bookstore
and, after browsing for "several minutes," purchased two
magazines with a marked fifty-dollar bill. Following a conference
outside the store, the officers determined that the magazines were
obscene and they returned to arrest the clerk, Baxter Macon. Ma-
con moved to suppress the magazines as fruits of an unlawful
search. The State asserted that there had been no "search" be-
cause the officers had merely purchased items regularly offered for
sale.2
1 6
The state prevailed in Macon because the Court concluded
that the purchase of the magazines did not constitute a
"search. '21 7 In contrast, the Court held that the intrusion involved
in Lo-Ji was a "search" because "there is no basis for the notion
that because a retail store invites the public to enter, it consents to
wholesale searches. . . that do not conform to Fourth Amendment
guarantees. 21' 8 The only critical factor distinguishing Macon from
Lo-Ji was the severity of the governmental intrusion. The fairly
unobtrusive purchase of two magazines offered for sale did not
constitute a "search," but the wholesale boxing up of similar
magazines did. As the Court noted in Macon, "[a]lthough a police
officer may not engage in a 'wholesale searc[h] . . .' in these cir-
cumstances, .. .nothing in our cases renders invalid under the
Fourth Amendment . . .the purchase as here by the police of a
214. 442 U.S. at 325.
215. Id. at 329.
216. 472 U.S. at 469.
217. Id.
218. 442 U.S. at 329.
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few of a large number of magazines and other materials offered for
sale.
2 19
The Court similarly has concluded that the propriety of using
an electronic "beeper" without a warrant depends upon the intru-
siveness of a given application of the technology. The Court has
held that the use of a beeper to track the course of a vehicle on
public streets does not constitute a "search" because, although the
beeper aids visual surveillance, it does not give police information
beyond that "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to
look. ' 220 When the government uses a beeper to monitor the move-
ment of materials inside a home, however, the Court has concluded
that a search occurs. 2 Such a case is unlike the use of a beeper on
the highway because the use of a beeper in a home reveals infor-
mation "about the interior of the premises" that the Government
cannot obtain by simple visual observation.22 Although the sur-
veillance technique in both instances is virtually identical, the use
of a beeper inside a home is too intrusive to escape constitutional
regulation. "Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat
to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of
Fourth Amendment oversight. '22 The relative intrusiveness of va-
rious surveillance techniques has determined the "search" issue in
many cases.2 24
219. 472 U.S. at 470, quoting Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 329. In addition to the "search"
question, both Lo-Ji and Macon concerned the issue whether an unlawful "seizure" of the
magazines had occurred. The "seizure" analysis, however, turned upon the same factors as
the "search" question, i.e., the nature of the official intrusion. In Lo-Ji state officers "seized"
the magazines by boxing them up "wholesale." 442 U.S. at 319. In Macon the Court found
no "seizure" because the complainant "voluntarily transferred any possessory interest he
may have had in the magazines to the purchaser upon the receipt of the funds." 472 U.S. at
469.
220. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
221. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
222. Id. at 715.
223. Id. at 716.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) ("It is well settled
that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his
confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information"); id. at 115-17, 120
(the conduct of government agents in opening and inspecting a package previously opened
by private individuals does not violate the fourth because it was no more intrusive than the
private investigation; the government invasion did not enable the government to learn any-
thing "that had not previously been learned during the private search" and therefore "[i]t
infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a 'search' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) ("sniff
test" of luggage by trained narcotics detection dog is not a "search"); Walter v. United
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Evaluation of the "intrusiveness" of governmental surveillance
is often closely related to the "place" analysis discussed earlier. In
Lo-Ji and Macon the magazines' location in a public store played a
significant role in evaluating the intrusiveness of a wholesale exam-
ination of the store's contents as opposed to a discrete sale. Simi-
larly, the electronic beeper cases appear to turn on the fact that
monitoring a beeper on a public street is less intrusive than track-
ing the device inside a home.225
The fact that the "place" and "intrusion" inquiries are often
related, and may in fact overlap, is not surprising.226 Unless a given
case concerns a "place" or an "intrusion" well toward either end of
the scales-such as breaking down the doors of a home or the con-
sensual viewing of an open field-neither factor alone is likely to
be determinative and the interplay of both is essential to the reso-
States, 447 U.S. 649, 657, 663-64 (1980) (opinion of Stevens, J., and opinion of Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (same proposition); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (striking down
random "stops" to check documents of motorists as unlawful searches and seizures, but
suggesting that the opinion "does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the
unconstrained exercise of discretion"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558
(1976) (the stopping of motorists at fixed checkpoints is a lesser intrusion upon the motor-
ist's fourth amendment interests than random "roving patrol" stops; "we view checkpoint
stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even
fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop");
see also United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981)
(squeezing some of the air out of an object to be tested by a trained dog before letting the
animal sniff the object is a "de minimus intrusion" and not a search); cf. Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (revenue agents who entered the defendant's home to
search the premises for violations of the revenue laws with the wife's consent violated the
fourth because the officers were actually admitted under "implied coercion").
225. A recent case is also illustrative. In Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), po-
lice entered respondent's apartment without a warrant after a bullet fired through the floor
of the apartment had injured another tenant. While inside, one officer noticed two sets of
expensive stereo equipment and, suspecting it to be stolen merchandise, read and recorded
the serial numbers, moving some of the components to do so. Despite the dissent's under-
standable protest that moving the equipment a few inches was a "minimal invasion of pri-
vacy," id. at 1160, (O'Connor, J., dissenting), the Court held that a "search" had taken place
because the officer had moved, not simply read, the serial numbers on the stereo compo-
nents. Id. at 1152. The best explanation for the Court's conclusion is that the act of moving
the components, though not highly intrusive in itself, occurred within respondent's apart-
ment-a place entitled to the highest constitutional protection. Cf. New York v. Class, 475
U.S. 106 (1986) (moving papers on an automobile's dashboard to uncover the vehicle's serial
number does not constitute a "search").
226. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (" 'No interest legitimately
protected by the Fourth Amendment' is implicated by governmental investigative activities
unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into the 'security a man relies upon when
he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area' ") (quoting Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)).
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lution of the "search" issue. In Dow and Ciraolo, for example,
neither the "place" nor the "intrusion" involved was decisive. Dow
Chemical's plant was not an "open field" such that aerial surveil-
lance was unquestionably constitutional without more. And the
backyard setting of Ciraolo, ordinarily entitled to heightened pro-
tection, was not determinative because the Court deemed any "in-
trusion" into the curtilage to be minimal. The Court's analysis,
however, did not stop there. Central to both cases was a considera-
tion of a third inquiry: the nature of the information sought and
obtained by the governmental surveillance.
C. The Object of Surveillance: Personal or Public?
Although, as has been noted above, dicta in Katz suggests that
"place" and "intrusion" inquiries have little or no constitutional
significance, the same cannot be said of the third factor tradition-
ally utilized by the Court in its "search" decisions. Indeed, by
holding that a telephone call made from a public phone booth was
protected regardless of location and the complete absence of any
physical intrusion, Katz based fourth amendment protection pri-
marily on the nature of the information obtained by the govern-
ment surveillance-a private telephone conversation.227 In focusing
on the conversation, rather than solely upon the place or intrusion
involved, the Katz Court explicitly established the object of gov-
ernmental surveillance as the third, and often crucial, inquiry in
fourth amendment "search" analysis.
This third element, like "place" and "intrusion," can be con-
ceived as a conceptual scale. Katz itself establishes one end of the
scale: the highly personal content of a private, interpersonal con-
versation is the type of information most likely to receive constitu-
tional protection against unauthorized official surveillance. Indeed,
in the absence of countervailing factors, the interception of inter-
personal conversation likely will violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy, thus implicating the fourth amendment. 28 The polar ex-
treme of the "object of surveillance" construct, where generally
courts would not find a "search," is best illustrated by an array of
decisions which hold that certain data, by their very nature, cannot
227. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
228. Countervailing factors include, of course, the "place" and "intrusion" inquiries.
If, for example, police seize a conversation without any constitutionally objectionable intru-
sion-such as recording a conversation voluntarily entered into with a government
agent-the Court likely would refuse to find that a "search" had occurred. See supra notes
211 & 224.
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support a legitimate claim of privacy. Such data, courts have
found, support only a diminished expectation of privacy because
the data either contain little information that is truly "private,"22
or they contain little personal information that society has a strong
interest in protecting as private.3 °
Despite an individual's most ardent desires, society and the
courts realistically cannot recognize certain information as "pri-
vate" in any real sense of the word. Such information includes a
person's own physical characteristics-appearance, height, weight,
and, in most cases, gender 23 1-which simply cannot be shielded
from the public gaze. The Supreme Court has concluded that this
category of inherently "public" information includes fingerprints
232
and the physical characteristics of the voice itself.233 Furthermore,
while a person's "papers" are entitled to explicit constitutional
protection, the actual vehicle of written communication-namely,
an individual's handwriting-is not "private" within the meaning
of the fourth. "Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to
the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the
physical characteristics of a person's script than there is in the
tone of his voice. "234
Similarly, the Court has concluded that the use of a pen regis-
ter2 35 to record local numbers dialed from a private phone does not
infringe upon a reasonable expectation of privacy because the only
information recorded by the device-the actual numbers dialed
from a particular telephone-is not in fact "private." On the con-
229. See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., pop star Boy George.
232. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (fingerprinting does not reveal per-
sonal or interpersonal information, it "involves none of the probing into an individual's pri-
vate life and thoughts that marks a . . . search").
233. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) ("The physical characteristics of a
person's voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are
constantly exposed to the public.. . . No person can have a reasonable expectation that
others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his
face will be a mystery to the world"); see also United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d
895, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[Wlhile the content of a communication is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection . .. the underlying identifying characteristics-the constant factor
throughout both public and private communications-are open for all to see or hear"), cert.
denied sub nom. Schwartz v. United States, 410 U.S. 941 (1973).
234. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973); see also United States v. Euge, 444
U.S. 707 (1980).
235. A pen register is a device that can record numbers dialed from a particular tele-
phone without recording the actual conversation. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742
(1979).
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trary, the numbers voluntarily are disclosed to the telephone com-
pany when the call is initiated."8 A pen register, moreover, does
not record any highly personal information. Unlike the listening
device employed in Katz, a pen register does "not acquire the con-
tents of communications. '23 7
In addition to the above communications which contain little
truly "private" data, there is certain information that society has
no significant interest in obscuring from official gaze because of its
functional role in modern society or its tenuous connection to fun-
damental privacy concerns. Thus, an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an automobile's vehicle identification
number (VIN) because "of the important role played by the VIN
in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobile and
the efforts by the Federal Government to ensure that the VIN is
placed in plain view. ' 238 Information recorded on checks and de-
posit slips is likewise beyond fourth amendment protection be-
cause, despite the sensitive nature of the documents themselves,
they are "negotiable instruments" passed in commerce and not
"confidential communications.""2 9 And, as Oliver reemphasized,
there is normally no legitimate expectation of privacy regarding
such impersonal information as the cultivation of crops in open
fields.240
In certain circumstances, the Court has held one final category
of information to be beyond the purview of the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Jacobsen24 1 the Court concluded that a dis-
crete sensing device, specifically, a specialized chemical test to de-
236. Id. at 743-46.
237. Id. at 741 (emphasis in original).
238. New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960, 966 (1986); cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149
(1987) (moving stereo equipment to uncover serial numbers during a warrantless entry of an
apartment constitutes a "search").
239. Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1975) (superseded by statute as stated
in Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 209 (D.D.C. 1980)).
240. In his Oliver dissent, Justice Marshall argued that open fields should indeed be
accorded fourth amendment protection because they may be the setting for intimate and
interpersonal activities such as lovers' trysts and secluded worship services. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 191-93 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority, of course, did
not argue that a given case, if truly involving such activities, would not merit constitutional
protection. It simply reasoned that open fields, "by their very character as open and unoccu-
pied, are unlikely to provide the setting for activities whose privacy is sought to be pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 179 n.10 (majority opinion). In any event, the
police seized or revealed no intimate personal information in Oliver. See supra notes 101-18
and accompanying text for a discussion of Oliver.
241. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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termine the presence of cocaine,242 which is capable of disclosing
only the presence of contraband, does not, of itself, disclose infor-
mation of a sufficiently personal nature to evoke fourth amend-
ment protection. 24 ' Although the Court's conclusion that a test
designed solely to determine the presence of contraband "does not
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy ' 24 4 is potentially
troublesome,245 possession of contraband is rather far removed
from the central concern of Katz-the protection of interpersonal
communication. 46 Moreover, the conclusion that the use of dis-
crete sensing devices to discover contraband does not involve a
"search" is consistent with one of the Court's most celebrated
fourth amendment decisions, Boyd v. United States. The modern-
day Court's refusal to extend full fourth amendment protection to
possession of contraband is reminiscent of Boyd's suggestion that a
defendant could not raise the amendment to guard against govern-
242. Id. at 123.
243. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (use of trained narcotics dog
to "sniff" luggage for presence of illegal drugs is not a "search"). A trained narcotics dog
could be described as a "discrete sensing device." Whether the use of such a dog constitutes
a search, however, does not depend solely upon this fact. In most instances, sniffing the air
around an object does not result in a constitutionally objectionable intrusion. See supra
note 224.
244. 466 U.S. at 123.
245. The Court previously has created a first amendment right to possess at least one
form of "contraband"--obscene pornography. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Although the facts of Stanley can be distinguished from Jacobsen because (1) Stanley con-
cerned the possession of contraband in the home, while Jacobsen concerned testing for con-
traband in public places, and (2) no one has a first amendment right to possess illegal drugs,
some tension exists between the cases. One author astutely has observed:
[T]he Court's analysis makes the legislature the arbiter of the scope of the fourth
amendment. Because Congress had decreed that cocaine was contraband, the use of the
chemical test in Jacobsen was not a search. If Congress were to make the possession of
cocaine legal, use of the test presumably would then be a search. The Court should not
make Congress the arbiter of the scope of a constitutional provision protecting individ-
ual rights.
Note, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz
Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 203.
246. In California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), the Court stated:
[O]ne who enters a telephone booth is entitled to assume that his conversation is not
being intercepted. This does not translate readily into a rule of constitutional dimen-
sions that one who grows illicit drugs in his backyard is "entitled to assume" his unlaw-
ful conduct will not be observed by a passing aircraft-or by a power company repair
mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard.
Id. at 1813; see also Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Inno-
cent, 81 MICH L. REV. 1229, 1244-48 (1983) (because the fourth amendment permits the
government to search for and seize evidence of a crime and there is no inherent right to
secrete such evidence, use of a device that can disclose only evidence of a crime is not a
"search").
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ment searches and seizures of stolen property. 247
The "object of surveillance" construct is useful in parsing
given facts to determine whether official surveillance infringes a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Ciraolo and Dow the fact
that the aerial overflights revealed nothing more than the presence
of contraband and the physical layout of a manufacturing facility,
as opposed to information directly related to "families or personal
privacy'248 or "identifiable human faces or secret documents, 249
was crucial to the Court's conclusion that no "search" had oc-
curred.250 But, like the "place" and "intrusion" factors, considera-
tion of the object of surveillance alone rarely determines whether
police have violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although
Katz establishes it as an essential inquiry, undue emphasis on the
object of governmental surveillance could well lead courts astray.
In United States v. Jacobsen, for example, Justice Brennan in
dissent chastised the Court for "its exclusive focus on the nature of
the information or item sought and revealed through the use of a
surveillance technique." 25' The Court's emphasis, he asserted, cre-
ates the possibility that "if a device were developed that could de-
tect, from the outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside,
there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising
through a residential neighborhood and using the device to iden-
tify all homes in which the drug is present. '25 2
Justice Brennan's criticism of the majority's approach, if accu-
rate, is telling. His prophecy of the future, moreover, is disturbing.
The Justice, however, is unduly grudging in his characterization of
the majority's approach. The object of the governmental surveil-
lance is not the "exclusive focus" of the opinion in Jacobsen. Fur-
thermore, a careful application of the three-factor approach set out
in this Article alleviates the fear, illustrated by Justice Brennan's
hypothetical police cocaine cruiser, that "search warrants. . . may
very well become notions of the past. '253
In Jacobsen Drug Enforcement Administration agents ex-
247. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886); see supra notes 21-25 and ac-
companying text. But cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (respondent successfully
raised fourth amendment to suppress evidence relating to the possession of stolen stereo
equipment).
248. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
249. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 n.5 (1986).
250. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
251. 466 U.S. 109, 137 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253. Id.
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amined the contents of a damaged package that an interstate ship-
per previously opened and inspected.2 5 The shipper, who opened
the damaged package pursuant to a company policy regarding in-
surance claims, notified the federal agents when it found a suspi-
cious white powder inside.255 The agents did nothing more than
examine the previously opened package and remove a small
amount of the powder for testing to determine the presence of co-
caine2 56 The question before the Court was whether either the
agents' inspection of the previously opened package or their testing
of the powder constituted a search.25
The majority opinion implicitly examined each of the factors
set forth in this Article. The Court first found that the official ac-
tion touched a constitutionally protected "place" because the
package "was unquestionably an 'effect' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." 58 The Court then went on to consider the
nature of the governmental intrusion and the object of the surveil-
lance in analyzing the "search" issue.
The Court found that, on the facts presented, the agents' ac-
tual examination of the package was not a constitutionally objec-
tionable intrusion. At the time the agents arrived to examine the
package, it had been thoroughly ransacked by private parties, who
voluntarily conveyed to the agents all the information they had ob-
tained.259 Because an "official invasion of the citizen's privacy must
be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time
that invasion occurred,""26 the agents' actions raised no constitu-
tional concern so long as they did not exceed the scope of the pri-
vate inspection.21 The agents' opening and physical examination
of the package did not frustrate any "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy and hence was not a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment" because such actions "enabled the agents to
learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the pri-
254. Id. at 111.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 111-12.
257. Id. at 118. The Court also considered whether the governmental action consti-
tuted an unlawful "seizure" under the fourth amendment. Id. at 121-22, 124-25. Although
the question of what constitutes an illegal "seizure" is beyond the scope of this Article, the
Court's conclusions on that point track almost precisely its "search" analysis. Id.
258. Id. at 114.
259. Id. at 115.
260. Id.
261. "The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information
with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated." Id. at 117.
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vate search. '2 62
The actual chemical testing of the powder, however, exceeded
the scope of the private search. The Court, therefore, moved be-
yond the intrusion inquiry to determine whether the information
obtained as a result of the test required a finding that a "search"
had occurred. The Court noted that the test's additional intrusion
was minimal; "only a trace amount of material was involved. '2' In
addition, the test "could disclose only one fact previously unknown
. . .- whether or not a suspicious white powder was cocaine. '264 It
could reveal nothing more, "not even whether the substance was
sugar or talcum powder. '26 5 In this context the Court concluded
that the official collection of this limited additional information
did not constitute a "search."
Thus, contrary to Justice Brennan's assertion, the Court did
not "focus[] . . . solely on the product of the would-be search" in
reaching its conclusion.266 Instead, the Court placed the official
surveillance in the context of where it occurred,267 and carefully
examined the nature of the governmental intrusion involved. In ex-
amining the chemical test, the Court looked to the nature of the
information obtained only after finding that the test, in any event,
represented a minimal governmental intrusion. And, because that
information had little to do with core concepts of intimacy and
personal autonomy and revealed only a single fact-the presence
or absence of cocaine-the test did "not compromise any legiti-
mate interest in privacy. '2 6 8
The Court's analysis, furthermore, does not support any well-
founded fear that the police will begin cruising the streets with
sensor devices trained on American homes in search of discrete
crimes.269 Such activity would be significantly more intrusive than
the official conduct at issue in Jacobsen.2 10 The intrusion, more-
over, would occur in a place traditionally accorded the strictest
262. Id. at 120.
263. Id. at 125.
264. Id. at 122.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. See id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In determining whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy has been violated, we have always looked to the context in which an
item is concealed").
268. Id. at 123.
269. See id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. Cf. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986) ("An electronic
device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions...
would raise very different and far more serious questions . . ").
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constitutional protection-the home.271 Accordingly, even if Justice
Brennan's hypothetical sensor could detect only the presence of
contraband, the first two factors in the search analysis suggest that
it could not be used without a warrant.
VII. CONCLUSION
The definition of a "search" under the fourth amendment has
provoked considerable controversy during its evolutionary history.
Beginning with concepts derived from the common law of trespass,
the Supreme Court developed doctrines dependent upon place and
physical intrusion which guided the judicial application of the
amendment until the 1967 decision of Katz v. United States. That
decision, which freed the concept of a "search" from archaic no-
tions of then-existing law, held that a "search" occurs any time
official surveillance impinges upon a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." The amorphous nature of that standard, however, cre-
ated substantial difficulties in actual application.
The potentially limitless number of factors relevant to the de-
termination whether a given expectation of privacy is "reasonable"
has resulted in confusion and uneven application of constitutional
doctrine. In at least one area-the opening of containers taken
from automobiles-the Court has reduced the disarray by ex-
panding the scope of the "automobile exception" to the warrant
clause, thereby eliminating any need to determine whether particu-
lar actions constitute a "search." But that approach to the difficul-
ties posed by the Katz test is not available throughout the wide
arena in which the decision applies.
Beginning with its decision in Oliver v. United States, and
continuing with the aerial surveillance opinions in California v.
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Supreme
Court has begun to narrow the range of factual and legal variables
impinging upon the "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis.
These decisions suggest that, in applying the Katz standard, the
Court looks to (1) the place or location where official surveillance
occurs, (2) the nature and degree of intrusiveness of the surveil-
lance itself, and (3) the object or goal of the surveillance. These
271. In its discussion of the seizure issue in Jacobsen, the Court implicitly suggested
that the place where material is seized may alter the constitutional analysis. United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 126 n.28 (1984) ("We do not suggest. . . that any seizure of a
small amount of material is necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take the
'white powder' he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and subject it to
a field test for cocaine, might well work an unreasonable seizure").
1128 [Vol. 40:1077
DEFINING PRIVACY
inquiries, although drawn from both pre- and post-Katz precedent,
are focused and modified by the privacy rationale of that decision.
Thus, fourth amendment protection does not depend solely upon a
finding of a particular intrusion into a defined place to obtain spec-
ified information. Rather, as Katz itself held, a "search" occurs
when government probing for information intrudes upon funda-
mental concepts of personal intimacy and privacy. The emerging
tripartite analysis does not obscure this fundamental teaching, but
instead aids in its rational and consistent judicial application.
The three inquiries isolated in this Article do not together
constitute an easy litmus test that points unerringly toward the
proper resolution of all fourth amendment "search" questions.
Particular instances of surveillance will require thoughtful scrutiny
and analysis of place, intrusiveness, and object as they interact in a
given fact pattern. Factually similar cases, for example, may differ
in result depending upon the perceived intrusiveness of the sur-
veillance or the nature of the information obtained. Nevertheless,
explicit judicial recognition and examination of the three con-
structs set out here will rationalize the sprawling legal vortex cre-
ated by Katz-a result long overdue on the twentieth anniversary
of the decision.
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